Belarus gets in political headwinds

Belarus gets in political headwinds

On August 9, Belarus will hold presidential elections where the acting president Alexander Lukashenko will face serious problems ever before. Thus, 2020 will start a new era for the Republic of Belarus in any case.

In 1994 Alexander Lukashenko won the elections for the first time. In the second round he scored 81%. The next elections were held in one round and were far from democratic ones. In 2001 he got 76% of votes, in 2006 – 83%, in 2010 – 80%, in 2015 – 84%. During this period of time Lukashenko could form a closed political system, exclude unsystematic opposition from the elections and gain as maximum authority as possible. In the 90s and early 2000s, Alexander Lukashenko completely satisfied the Russian elite who had taken forward steps to absorb the state of Belarus under Russia’s imperial project. Ultimately, these steps would result in Minsk’s complete loss of state sovereignty.

Serious problems started in the mid-2000, the time of serious of economic conflicts between the states, in particular, the price of Russian gas, reducing oil supplies to Belarusian refineries and increasing crude oil duty, a ban on importing dairy products to the Russian Federation. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine worsened the situation and made it tenser. The Kremlin declared a new trade war on Minsk that on the top of traditional oil and gas included food as well. In turn, Belarus virtually restored the border with Russia and economically blocked the Kaliningrad region on some goods. Alexander Lukashenko’s statements on economic and political issues with the Russian Federation mentioned have become more and more harsh. Simultaneously, he tried to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy. However, in the view of cold relations with the West this direction was not the most effective way to confront the Russian Federation. At the same time, Lukashenko managed to build relations with China who considers the Republic of Belarus as a sphere of its geo-economic interests.

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Alexander Lukashenko.

Russia has repeatedly clarified its position. The Kremlin needs Minsk’s deep political integration into the Russian imperial project. That is why Moscow offered economic benefits for Belarus. In turn, Lukashenko insisted on economic benefits and further possible political integration. At the same time, the sitting president of Belarus has recently pursued a policy of so called ‘soft Belarusianization’ that was negatively taken by Russia. Thus, by the beginning of the 2000s, Alexander Lukashenko did not sit well with the Kremlin as the president of Belarus completely. Taking into account the actions and statements, Minsk understood it quite well.

Moscow did not have and does not have a powerful pro-Russian candidate – for many years the incumbent president of the Republic of Belarus has been cleaning up the political opposition systematically. Therefore, Russia does not bet on any candidate in the upcoming election. The Kremlin is interested in destabilization of the situation to the maximum. Today the socio-economic background for such outcome is more than favorable.

The years of Lukashenko’s rule have risen several generations of citizens who are not satisfied with the political elite invariability anymore. The latest information technologies make it possible to state the position and unite supporters rather quickly without using traditional media. At the same time, the trade war with the Russian Federation, the economic crisis, including COVID-19, as well as the deterioration of public socio-economic security level are fueled by the protest electorate whose scale can be decisive for the developments for the first time in many years. It is not yet a matter of the fact that one of the host of opposition candidates, whether blogger Sergei Tikhanovski, his wife, or banker and public figure Viktor Babariko, will receive the necessary votes if they participate in the elections. The most likely scenario involves massive protests after the announcement of the victory of Alexander Lukashenko and his accusations of mass falsification.

The noteworthy detail is that the highest rated opposition candidates Tikhanovski and Babariko (as far as Internet audience assessment shows) do not oppose integration with Russia and do not stand for the West. Their rhetoric on this issue does not actually differ from the statements of the current president. Thus, in his interview to DW Tikhanovski said, ‘Belarus must be a sovereign state, it must be in friendly relations with the West, with the East, the North and the South. We should not maintain friendship with someone against someone but pursue friendly policy with everyone on an equal footing (…). As of Russia we should have exclusively friendly relations with the country, however, the Union State project is obsolete. While Belarus has not integrated so deeply, everything can be changed, the agreement can be terminated. I believe we should not become a part of Russia and integrate deeper in any case’.

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Sergei Tikhanovski.

Babariko has the same position, ‘I have a positive attitude towards integration when sovereignty is not jeopardized and when it is built on mutually beneficial conditions (…). We take the word ‘integration’ negatively because we think about dependence. Yesterday we discussed my statement on the single currency (in my interview to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper I stated that the currency could be introduced only if it was economically reasonable). The Belarusians thought about the Russian ruble. Why not to think about Belarusian ruble?’

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Viktor Babariko.

Thus, it seems like the future protest will have no geopolitical background. The main actual emphasis is the personality of Alexander Lukashenko. The dehumanization technologies, such as ‘Stop Cockroach!’ (a cockroach means Lukashenko who wears a mustache), ‘Kill a cockroach with a slipper!’, ‘Slipper revolution’ campaigns, have been actively used. Obviously, radical mood will increase.

The technologies, traditionally used during riots against political leaders, are not only aimed at making people fearless and getting them prepared for violence. In this case, they should also turn the political leader against the protesters to the full. In turn, he will be emotionally high enough to make a tough decision at the right time.

So far, Lukashenko demonstrates his readiness for such a development. Igor Sergeyenko, the KGB First Deputy chairman appointed as the head of the Presidential Administration in December 2019, resign of Prime Minister Sergei Rumas in June and appointment of Roman Golovchenko, a former head of the country’s State Authority for Military Industry, as the head of the government – all these staff changes pursue the goal to ensuring the security of Lukashenko’s political future. The President of the Republic of Belarus demonstrates readiness for a forceful scenario of staying in power. So far, this is a preventive measure to cool hot heads of the ones who hesitating about participation in the future protests. However, the situation will likely rage out of control. It is possible that crowd control or a high-profile assassination of an opposition leader can play as a trigger to radicalize the events. After that, Lukashenko will turn to tough measures to maintain power and he will likely manage to keep it.

Any possible scenario of developments is profitable for Russia. If Alexander Lukashenko is overthrown during mass protests, one of the current opposition candidates will take his place. These candidates have no experience and are much weaker than Alexander Lukashenko. In addition, the whole state vertical system that has been created in the interests of one person for many years will fall. In this case, Belarus will face with a long political crisis that will make the country weaker and push China away. In case of economic dependence on Russia the new president will have to negotiate with the Kremlin, however, the diplomatic hand will be weaker.

If Alexander Lukashenko suppresses mass riots in a tough way and finds himself in the center of a scandal involving killing of people, it will automatically thwart all attempts to create a multipolar geopolitical vector system. Western politicians will be forced to cool relations with Belarus more and more. In this case Lukashenko will have no opportunity for making geopolitical maneuver, his diplomatic hand will become weaker and he will be forced to make the national sovereignty concessions in favor of Russia.

There is the third but the least likely option. It involves the maximum protest tensions, street clashes, seizures of building by protesters, including with the help of hidden Russian interventionists from the security services and right-wing organizations. This development is aimed at destabilizing the situation as much as possible, and showing that Alexander Lukashenko and the Belarusian authorities cannot cope with the masses. In this case the Kremlin may bring troops by demonstrating ‘fraternal support’. The main goal here is to get complete control over Belarus and deploy army on the eastern borders of the European Union for an indefinite period. Perhaps, the only way to change the situation would be more or less democratic elections with the participation of a successor and a further Constitutional amendment in terms of creating a post for the former president or without him. However, Alexander Lukashenko associates himself with Belarus and the presidential chair too strong to allow this scenario to happen. Moreover, he does not trust the environment to take such a step as well. In addition, the time for this decision has already passed. Thus, Belarus enters the zone of political turbulence that will likely make the country weaker and create for the Kremlin opportunities for more beneficial relations with the Russian Federation.