Since taking office, Hichilema’s administration has shown little appetite to change the laws that enabled the authoritarian tendencies of his predecessor. He is entrenching the same system of autocracy he pledged to eliminate, ahead of his election in August 2021.
Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema appears positive in contrast to the disastrous predecessor Edgar Chagwa Lungu. However, if the public become disenchanted with the governing United Party for National Development (UPND), voters are more likely to see the opposition Patriotic Front (PF) differently, especially if the former governing party manages to resolve its leadership question and comes out of its elective conference united. If Hichilema’s political position becomes threatened, he may resort to bribery, repression, or both. Unless civil society wakes up soon or new progressive voices emerge, Zambia’s democracy may return to the same position it was in under Lungu.
Hichilema do not withdraw the law on defamation of the president, which makes it an offence to publish “any defamatory or insulting matter with intent to bring the President into hatred, ridicule, or contempt”. This crime, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment, has been widely interpreted and used to deter legitimate criticism. It has undermined media freedom, led to the arrest of critical voices.
Also he upheld the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act, which was hurriedly enacted by the Lungu administration on the eve of last year’s election. It violates the right to privacy by allowing the authorities to tap ICT devices, effectively turning everyone into a suspect, and confiscate electronics without proper procedural safeguards.
Finally, he do not repeal the Public Order Act (POA) that requires any person who intends to convene a public meeting to “give police at least seven days’ notice” and other details. This colonial-era law has been used by successive administrations to restrict the rights to assembly and free speech. Under Lungu, opposition meetings and demonstrations were repeatedly curtailed under the pretext of this act. Violations are punishable by up to six years’ imprisonment.
In opposition, Hichilema vowed to repeal the first two of these statutes immediately and reform the POA on assuming office. Repealing an act of parliament requires a simple majority, and the governing UPND holds 99 of the National Assembly’s 164 seats. In power, however, Hichilema has shown a studied disinterest in fulfilling these promises.According to Sishuwa Sishuwa, a Research Fellow in the Institute for Democracy, Hichilema shows attempts to limit the freedom of media.
Under Lungu, numerous critical media outlets were shut down. The Post, Zambia’s leading independent newspaper since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991, was forcibly closed in June 2016, less than two months before a general election, under the pretext of a disputed tax bill. Prime TV, the country’s leading private television station, was forcibly closed in April 2020 in the “public interest”, although no specific charges were laid out.
Despite Hichilema’s administration is yet to close any media stations, it has overseen four worrying developments:
- the government has introduced a 16% Value Added Tax on newspaper sales, for both print and electronic copies. This move is widely seen as targeted at three private newspapers, since state-owned publications face no consequences for failure to meet their tax obligations. With the economy performing poorly and media outlets already struggling, this move threatens to raise the price of newspapers out of the reach of more Zambians and collapse the industry.
- the government has continued with the Lungu-era harassment of the private media. This January, the private TV station KBN published a leaked audio of a phone conversation between Hichilema’s political aide, Levy Ngoma, and permanent secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Josephs Akafumba. The two were heard plotting to use state institutions to undermine the opposition Democratic Party ahead of a by-election. Ngoma suggested the scheme was sanctioned by the president and vice-president. Authorities initially claimed the audio was fake. When this failed, they accused the journalists of having tapped the pair’s phones. Instead of interrogating Ngoma and Akafumba, police arrested the reporters who had leaked the conversation.
- Officials have intimidated independent media. In February 2022, the UPND MP Heartson Mabeta threatened News Diggers, arguably the most influential private newspaper, with closure after the publication ran a story quoting the UPND secretary general saying the party did not sign a contract with anyone to guarantee them employment. Mabeta accused the newspaper of malice and warned that it risks meeting same fate as The Post if it did not change course. No one from the government or the UPND distanced themselves from the MP’s threats.
- The UPND has emulated its predecessor’s legacy of denying coverage to opposition parties in the state-run media. In opposition, Hichilema pledged to stop this culture by transforming the state media into genuine public platforms, establishing legal safeguards for editorial independence, and reviewing legislation that undermine their governance structures and leave them vulnerable to political interference.
Opposition parties were continuously obstructed by Lungu, it was expected that Hichilema would behave differently. This has not been the case so far. On 15 March 2022, the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly banned 30 opposition lawmakers from parliament for 30 days after their peaceful protest in November 2021.
Protests are a commonplace tactic in multiparty democracies, and the form they can take is hardly prescribed anywhere. To treat the action by the PF MPs as a major offence highlights Zambia’s new slant towards repression in which any dissent is prohibited.
The ongoing suspension of 39 of the PF’s 51 MPs suggests an organised effort to weaken the main opposition or intimidate it into submission. It also means there is effectively no opposition party in the National Assembly currently.The suspensions also appear to be motivated by a desire for revenge. In June 2017, the PF-aligned Speaker suspended 48 UPND lawmakers for boycotting Lungu’s state of the nation address. At the time, Hichilema and the UPND condemned the move as an assault on democracy.
As well as pressuring state institutions to directly get involved in an internal party matter, the ruling party is instigating divisions within opposition parties and over-stretching their meagre resources in the same way the PF did while in government. Opposition parties with little power are potentially being used to manipulate electoral law to suit Hichilema’s party The UPND is using the same tactics as the PF, but without the consequences of criticism from civil society and international actors.
Sishuwa Sishuwa from the Institute for Democracy supposes that Hichilema has also demonstrated a lack of commitment to fighting corruption. Despite being elected a platform of anti-corruption, accountability and transparency, he has so far failed to disclose the value of his assets. Along with Lungu, he is the only major party nominee and president to do so. This is especially concerning as Zambian presidents have generally used state power to accumulate wealth. In less than 16 months in power, for instance, Although there is no evidence to suggest Hichilema has started stealing public funds or using public office to promote his private interests, his reluctance to publish his net worth is concerning given his extensive business interests.
Hichilema’s anti-corruption strategy has been chaotic at best and non-existent at worst. Not a single member of the former Lungu’s regime has been taken to court on serious corruption charges. Hichilema continues to accuse PF leaders of having presided over a corrupt administration. However he delegitimises the opposition party’s reputation rather than has plans to prosecute those who looted public funds. Some members who were deeply involved in high-level corruption under Lungu have since transitioned and cultivated new allies in the governing party.
Under Lungu, political violence around election was commonplace. The perpetrators were usually PF supporters, while UPND supporters were typically the victims. In opposition, Hichilema pledged to end this culture of political violence, but if the two by-elections since his election are any indicator, very little has changed. But the polls in both Kaumbwe, Eastern Province, Kabwata, Lusaka, featured violent activities that saw suspected UPND cadres beat opposition supporters. The political violence in Kabwata was preceded by clear threats of violence from senior UPND members, none of whom has been arrested or reprimanded by the party’s leadership.
Although it may have slightly improved under Hakainde Hichilema, Zambia’s democratic trajectory remains most concerning. Based on its early track record, the Hichilema administration has shown a lack of willingness to make structural changes to strengthen accountable, democratic governance.
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