The ongoing confrontation between the military and Rapid Support Forces undermines stability in Sudan and the region.
Since April 22nd, violent clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been raging in the capital Khartoum and in other strategic areas throughout the country. While it’s unclear who initiated the fighting, the situation brings the de-facto leader of Sudan, the SAF’s General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, into direct confrontation with his deputy, the RSF’s General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, who is also referred to as “Hemetti.”
The two leaders had previously worked together, toppling the al-Bashir regime in 2019 and orchestrating a military coup in October 2021 that removed the civilian prime minister and cabinet and suspended the constitution. But after the SAF, RSF and civilian political leaders agreed to a new framework for a democratic transition in December, questions emerged over how the RSF would be integrated into the SAF, as well as over who would assume leadership of the newly consolidated military.
Tensions quickly rose between al-Burhan and Hemetti in the weeks leading up to the current violence. The two sides are battling for control of the country’s major institutions, as reports indicate much of the fighting has centered around locations such as the presidential palace, SAF’s military headquarters and Khartoum’s airport.
Even with successful mediation, this outbreak of violence threatens to weaken Sudan’s already shaky stability — and could undermine peace in the broader Horn of Africa region as well.
Both al-Burhan and Hemetti are trading accusations about who started the clashes in Khartoum. But in the weeks before, the RSF had deployed large numbers of armed men into Khartoum, and the SAF had deployed tanks and heavy weapons. And just days before the clashes in the capital, the RSF had deployed to Marowe, a town in the northern part of the country, and fighting had taken place there.
The RSF’s origins as the Janjaweed militia clearly signal its willingness to use brutal methods to achieve its goals, as it did in imposing its control over Darfur in the 2000s. It showed equally little compunction in killing civilians demonstrating peacefully in Khartoum in June 2019. Having been allowed by Bashir to build up RSF for his personal protection, Hemetti turned against him and was instrumental in his ousting from power. He seems intent on doing the same to Burhan.
Both al-Burhan and Hemetti were anticipating and gearing up for a confrontation. Both appear to have lost confidence in the political process, shifting instead to the logic of war and violence.
Hemedti claims to be defending the civilian transition from the Army’s attempts to subvert it, and that Burhan has failed to purge the SAF of Islamist officers put in place by Bashir who are still pursuing an Islamist agenda.
Burhan appears to have retained the support of veteran Darfuri rebels – Hemetti’s rivals, Minni Minawi, leader of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and Jibril Ibrahim, leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and currently Minister of Finance. But the RSF continues to control the bulk of the gold mines in the Darfur region which provide a regular flow of cash for the RSF leader. The SAF relies on the state revenues from oil, which is severely disrupted by the fighting, and its own businesses. The fighting is not least over control of the country’s wealth.
The fighting is a struggle over power in the security sector and the exercise of power in the state. The timing and sequencing of the integration of the RSF forces in the SAF has been one of the main sticking points, as Hemetti argued that reforms for a more inclusive, professional military are needed before his forces integrate. It appears that he also argued to maintain his own paramilitary as a guarantee through the elections. Conversely, elements in the SAF expressed fears that the proposed reforms could hollow out the military and leave it open for the RSF to dominate. The other sticking point is the command structure and the relationship between al-Burhan and Hemetti in that structure.
The fighting is different from what Sudan has experienced in the past. During previous civil wars in Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains), the Sudanese government or paramilitary groups have fought against armed resistance movements. Today, the SAF is fighting a paramilitary force that was created by the Bashir regime. The RSF is not a “rebel” group — it’s recognized by law and was developed, tolerated and sustained as an instrument of state power, making the situation much more complicated.
In the days ahead, it will be important to pay attention to any fluid alignments and re-ordering of alliances in the region — with the postures of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and South Sudan being particularly noteworthy. If fighting continues without a viable avenue for peace or even in the case of a humanitarian pause, the SAF and RSF will need supply lines, and regional governments, as well as those in the Gulf, with vested interests in Sudan may be tempted to throw their weight behind one or the other.
The clashes in Sudan are threatening Chad because both countries share a complicated past and there are risks of rising ethnic tensions. The Sudan’s RSF commander has important ties to Chadian Arab tribesmen. As many as 20,000 people from Darfur have fled to Chad.
People from the Tendelti area in West Darfur were amongst those who sought refuge in Chad out of fear of the ongoing battles between the army and the Rapid Support Forces.
Soon after the outbreak of the violence in Khartoum Chad closed its border with Sudan. It later announced that it had received more than 320 defecting Sudanese military soldiers who fled the violence inside its territory.
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N’Djamena reported that the soldiers of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) had fled to Chad after the eruption of the clashes between the SAF and RSF. They had crossed the border and surrendered to the Chadian army.
Chadian Defense Minister General Daoud Ibrahim said that the Sudanese military “entered our lands”. “They have all been disarmed and sheltered.”
He added that “those who surrendered to our forces are 320 members of the Sudanese Armed Forces, from the gendarmerie, police and army. They fled fearing they would be killed by the RSF.”
According to the French Le Monde, the Chadian authorities are not officially taking sides in this war, but they are clearly leaning to one side.
The Chadian government is keeping silence because the situation is still uncertain, but the seizure of power by an irregular force in which many Arabs from the Chadian-Sudanese border find themselves would be a threat to Chadian stability. The RSF commander, who was also part of the Janjaweed militias that terrorized Darfur, has solid connections to Chadian elites and important networks in the country. President Déby’s private chief of staff is a direct cousin of Hemedti, and his Rizeigat clan moved to Darfur from Chad.
The Rizeigat are part of the Baggara Arab nomads.
According to Le Monde, the Chadian authorities fear that a victory for the RSF will strengthen political and military ambitions within the large Chadian Arab community.
It is feared that the powerful militia leader will promote the rise of his Rizeigat clan if he comes to control Sudan, to the detriment of the Zaghawa, a non-Arab African nomadic herding tribe based in Chad and Darfur, who have constituted the heart of Chadian power for over 30 years.
The biggest challenge for Chad is the Arab equation. Many of Chadians are with him and if he were to win, they think they will be supported and armed.
At the same time, however, the Council of Arab Tribes in Chad issued a statement in which they consoled Chadian clans over the death of hundreds of people in a “nonsensical war” driven by the Hemeti’s “personal greed”. It slammed the RSF’s exploitation of economic hardship in Chad to recruit thousands of Chadian tribesmen, reportedly under the pretext of sending them to Yemen.
Instead, they were killed. The council called on the RSF to surrender to the SAF but appealed to El Burhan and Minni Minawi to grant Chadian recruits amnesty and a safe passage back to Chad.
As the fighting continues, the humanitarian situation is becoming more dire, especially in Sudanese cities.
