Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced in a hard-hitting televised speech on the evening of 17 August that his country would not hold further talks with Ethiopia unless it “recognises the sovereignty of Somalia,” putting the future of Turkish mediation in jeopardy.
Turkey launched an initiative to reconcile two of its most important partners in East Africa in May following Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s visit to Ankara.
Ties between the two countries soured earlier this year following a deal that saw the self-declared republic of Somaliland agree to lease part of its Red Sea coastline to its landlocked neighbour Ethiopia.
The Somali government strongly rejected the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal and accused Ethiopia of violating Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Somali Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, has sharply criticized Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, accusing him of attempting to ignite conflict in the Horn of Africa as a diversion from Ethiopia’s internal challenges.
Addis Ababa recognised the region’s independence and plans to build a naval base on the land. Somalia considered the deal an infringement on its sovereignty.
In July, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosted his Somali and Ethiopian counterparts Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and Taye Aske Selassie followed by a joint statement describing talks as “candid and cordial”.
A second round of indirect talks scheduled for early September in Ankara were then brought forward to August, raising expectations of major developments which in the end did not materialise on the ground.
Turkey’s choice to play the role of mediator is due to its solid relations with both parties to the conflict, with Ankara one of the prominent regional players in the Horn of Africa, which has high geostrategic importance.
Turkey has multifaceted interests in Ethiopia and is reportedly the second largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the African state after China.
Еhere are around 200 Turkish companies operating in Ethiopia across various sectors, notably construction, pharmaceuticals, and the food industry.
The East African country is also one of the largest buyers of Turkish drones and ammunition on the continent.
Somalia, meanwhile, is the backbone of Turkish influence in the region, as it hosts the largest Turkish military base abroad. Türkiye has also been active in the strategically located country since 2011, and in February the two parties signed an economic defence agreement under which Ankara will help Somalia defend its territorial waters in exchange for economic benefits.
Turkish efforts between Somalia and Ethiopia come in the context of Turkey’s growing role as a regional and international mediator.
Ankara’s willingness to mediate in this geo-strategically sensitive region is part of a broader strategy to enhance its influence in Africa through soft power tools such as providing economic and diplomatic support and humanitarian aid.
Turkey’s large investments in the two countries also seem to be a motivating factor for Ankara to prevent the deterioration of relations between them, as any looming war in the region could threaten Ankara’s interests.
The current dispute has broader geopolitical impacts beyond the concerns of Somalia and Ethiopia, as it may affect Djibouti and the Red Sea Basin, and therefore Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.
Türkiye seeks to maintain a balance against the potential disruption of geostrategic interests and the risks of allowing non-state armed actors and terrorist organisations to get involved in this process.
Moreover, Turkey’s initiative in this mediation is an attempt by Ankara to play a role in supporting and defending international law within the global order, given that the MoU signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland is not considered valid.
The escalating dispute between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa represents a test of Turkish diplomacy’s ability to bridge the gap between two states whose relations have historically been characterised by mutual hostility.
In this context Ankara used diplomacy at the highest level, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud and the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed directly, or via telephone conversations, to break the ice between the two parties.
But these efforts have not yet succeeded in achieving a tangible improvement. Only a cancellation of the MoU would entice Somalia to start negotiations.
Mogadishu is demanding Addis Ababa not to militarise its economic ambitions and that developing a military base in the Red Sea would pose a security risk to regional countries wary of the rise of Ethiopian influence.
Somalia would open its ports to Ethiopian trade as is the case in Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania. However, there are indications that Addis Ababa does not want the dispute to escalate.
Addis Ababa aims to make Somalia and Turkey understand its need for a sea outlet based on its economic and security concerns.
The Turkish Foreign Minister has indicated that tensions between the two countries could end with access to the sea for Ethiopia via Somalia, as long as it recognises its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
The Question is how to unravel the knot embodied by the contradictory positions reflected in the Red Sea MoU.
It will be difficult for the Ethiopian side to back down from the MoU because this will only happen on condition of ensuring alternatives that meet Addis Ababa’s security and economic demands.
While the economic aspect could be achieved through an agreement with Somalia, it will be difficult for Mogadishu to agree to the military base that Ethiopia is demanding to secure its interests.
Turkish efforts are still a long way from convincing the two parties to make concessions.
Ethiopia’s desire to separate the MoU file from negotiations on sea access will lead to the failure of Turkish mediation.The two parties acceptance of diplomacy as a tool to overcome the crisis is in itself a success worthy of support in order to prevent the future possibility of armed conflict.
