Egypt creates anti-Ethiopia alliance in the Horn of Africa

The recent strengthening of relations between Egypt and certain African nations may indicate a rising likelihood of conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia.

In early October, the presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia gathered in Asmara for a trilateral regional cooperation summit, during which the leaders pledged military support for Somalia’s counterterrorism efforts, agreeing to deploy troops under the African Union (AU) mission.

The move was widely seen by observers as Cairo’s response to Ethiopia’s growing regional influence, particularly after Addis Ababa signed a memorandum of understanding with the self-declared republic of Somaliland in January to lease part of its coastline for a military base in return for recognising the region’s independence.

Egypt has been involved in a diplomatic dispute with Ethiopia for years over the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Cairo views as a threat to its national security.

 The Entebbe Agreement, a landmark accord for managing the waters of the Nile River, entered into force earlier in October, perceived by both Egypt and Sudan as a threat to their water security.

The Asmara summit is part of Egypt’s efforts to regain its African allies through high-level diplomatic and military partnerships with neighbouring states.

Egyptian decision-makers have placed growing emphasis on building stronger relations with African nations since 2019.

In August 2023, Egypt and Somalia signed a joint military defence agreement, which was soon followed by two shipments of Egyptian arms and military equipment within two months.

A month later, Cairo also signed a mutual defence agreement with Eritrea, following a series of high-level diplomatic exchanges. In October, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, with both sides stressing the need for cooperation, particularly in military fields.

Egypt’s strategic alliances in Africa have moved beyond traditional cooperation to encompass more military and security-driven interactions. These moves also could be viewed as attempts to counter Ethiopia’s efforts to dominate Egypt’s interests in the Horn of Africa, particularly citing Ethiopia’s unilateral construction of GERD without reaching agreements with downstream countries and its influence over South Sudan to ratify the Entebbe Agreement.

The GERD quickly turned into a nationalistic project under Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. It lacked environmental impact assessments that measure potential harm on downstream countries.

The filling of the GERD over the past five years has significantly reduced Egypt’s water supply. 

As a result, Egypt has been forced to rely on water reserves from the Aswan High Dam to compensate for the shortfall. 

Though the exact reduction in Cairo’s water quota remains confidential due to ongoing negotiations with Ethiopia, the Egyptian government has taken steps to address the water crisis. 

These measures include wastewater treatment projects, the development of agricultural greenhouses, and restrictions on water-intensive crops like rice, efforts that have cost Egypt billions.

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In May 2011, a year after the Entebbe Agreement was signed, Essam Sharaf, then Egypt’s prime minister, visited Uganda and Ethiopia to negotiate a settlement over Nile waters. However, after ten years of talks, all negotiations have failed. 

In 2013, Ethiopia and Rwanda ratified the Entebbe Agreement, followed by Tanzania in 2015 and Uganda later that same year. In a surprising move, South Sudan ratified the agreement in August 2023. According to the terms, the treaty should come into effect 60 days after two-thirds of the Nile Basin’s 11 member states ratify it.

Ethiopia’s success in rallying the Nile Basin countries to its side was predictable, given Egypt’s diminished influence in Africa compared to the Nasser era. 

Former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser identified three key spheres of influence for Egypt – Arab, African, and Islamic.

At the time, many African nations were fighting for independence, and Egypt, using its soft power, including multi-lingual radio broadcasts, played a unifying role across the continent. Egypt also backed African liberation movements with arms, training, and resources.

However, Egypt’s role in Africa gradually declined during President Anwar Sadat’s era, as his administration “shifted focus to the West at the expense of Africa. 

The decline continued under President Hosni Mubarak, particularly after an assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in 1995. Mubarak’s security concerns led him to avoid official visits to African nations, reducing Egypt’s engagement to the diplomatic level.

Thus, Mubarak’s era signalled a significant decline in African relations. 

“Egyptian institutions remained active in Africa despite the lack of presidential representation.

Ethiopia’s political and strategic ambitions in Africa are effectively filling the void left by Egypt.

Ethiopia is now pushing for a potential military base in Somaliland, bypassing Somalia’s official government in Mogadishu and offering to recognise Somaliland’s independence.

However, it could also be a strategic leverage tool for Cairo to pressure Addis Ababa, particularly on GERD and the Entebbe Agreement,.

Egypt is actively engaging with countries in the Horn of Africa in an effort to draw those previously aligned with Ethiopia through the Entebbe Agreement into its camp. The goal is to build a coalition strong enough to compel Ethiopia to negotiate,.

The Egyptian presence in the nations bordering Ethiopia to the east, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti, especially in military terms, acts as a thorn in Ethiopia’s side, which has a pressing need for maritime access.

Egypt’s growing interests in Africa may also be partially driven by internal concerns. 

Egypt’s response is likely influenced by threats to its water and economic security due to the GERD crisis and declining Suez Canal revenues. Domestically, these issues are crucial for Egyptian public opinion, especially given recent provocations by Israel’s presence at the Philadelphi Corridor, its potential plans to reoccupy Gaza, and the current turmoil in Sudan.

Thus, a new regional axis is emerging as Egypt and Ethiopia each pursue their own interests, wherein Egypt is actively attracting allies, while Ethiopia’s actions, such as recognising Somaliland, are pushing Eritrea and other Nile Basin nations closer to Egypt.

So, Ethiopia believed that recognising a separatist region (Somaliland) in exchange for access to the Red Sea was a strategic move. But the message received by many African countries was that Ethiopia is a state with expansionist ambitions, willing to support separatist movements across other nations. This perception has driven Asmara to ally with Egypt, especially given Egypt’s growing influence in Somalia.Omar also offered another reason for Eritrea’s alignment with Egypt – has also the factor of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Eritrea views the TPLF, which borders Eritrea, as an existential threat.