Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape is once again being tested as Thailand and Cambodia, two neighboring ASEAN members, find themselves embroiled in increasing bilateral tensions. Rooted in historical grievances, territorial disputes, and national identity narratives, the current strain has been exacerbated by political transformations in both countries and new dynamics brought by foreign economic and military interests. While overt conflict remains unlikely in the short term, hybrid tensions—spanning military, informational, and diplomatic domains—may escalate.
1. Causes of Growing Tensions
a. Historical and Territorial Disputes
The Preah Vihear Temple dispute remains a symbolic and strategic flashpoint. Although the International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Cambodia in 2013, parts of the surrounding territory remain contested. This dispute periodically resurfaces, especially when nationalist rhetoric is politically expedient in either country.
b. Border Militarization and Illegal Activities
The border region is a hotspot for smuggling, illegal logging, and human trafficking. Thailand’s increased militarization to control these activities has been interpreted by Cambodia as aggressive posturing. Conversely, Thai authorities accuse Cambodian border guards of tolerating or enabling illegal cross-border trade.
c. Political Changes and Domestic Instability
Thailand’s political instability and military-influenced governance, paired with Hun Manet’s attempts to consolidate power after succeeding his father Hun Sen, have shifted both countries toward nationalist and security-centric policies. These dynamics make bilateral diplomacy more fragile and reactive.
d. Ethnic and Labor Issues
The mistreatment of Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand and rising anti-Cambodian sentiment, particularly in Thai border provinces, further strain relations. Cambodian authorities view these incidents as provocations, while Thailand claims it is addressing labor law violations.
2. Possible Scenarios
Scenario 1: Diplomatic Escalation Without Armed Conflict
In this most probable scenario, tensions flare through harsh rhetoric, visa restrictions, temporary border closures, or nationalist protests, but direct conflict is avoided due to economic interdependence and ASEAN mediation.
Scenario 2: Localized Border Skirmishes
Unplanned confrontations between border patrol units—exacerbated by local actors or criminal networks—could escalate into brief armed clashes. A precedent exists in the 2008–2011 border conflict around Preah Vihear.
Scenario 3: Prolonged Hybrid Conflict
In a more complex escalation, both countries could engage in information warfare, economic boycotts, and the use of diaspora groups or criminal proxies to destabilize the other, while avoiding direct war. This scenario would likely be influenced by external actors.
Scenario 4: Third-Party Mediation and De-escalation
ASEAN or external powers such as China, the U.S., or Japan may intervene diplomatically to prevent destabilization in a strategically important region. This scenario depends on the willingness of both governments to internationalize the issue.
3. Consequences for the Region
- Security Fragility: Even minor clashes could encourage other border disputes in Southeast Asia to resurface, undermining ASEAN’s stability.
- Humanitarian Impact: Refugee flows, disrupted trade, and human rights violations—especially against migrants—could follow even limited conflict.
- Economic Setback: Cambodia’s labor exports to Thailand and Thailand’s investments in Cambodia could be severely disrupted, affecting GDP and employment in both countries.
- ASEAN Unity Erosion: ASEAN’s non-interference principle may be tested, deepening divisions within the bloc.
4. Foreign Forces and Interests
China
China has deep economic and military ties with both states, though it is particularly close to Cambodia. Beijing could exploit the rift to consolidate influence in Phnom Penh while pressuring Thailand to remain neutral in larger Indo-Pacific competition. A conflict also gives China leverage over ASEAN decision-making.
United States
The U.S. may support Thai democratic movements and frame itself as a stabilizing actor, especially if China is seen as fanning regional tensions. However, Washington has limited leverage in Cambodia due to Phnom Penh’s pro-Beijing stance.
Vietnam
Vietnam is a wary observer, concerned that instability could spill over or shift Cambodia further into China’s orbit. Hanoi could use backchannels to pressure Cambodia to de-escalate.
Japan and South Korea
Both countries have major economic interests in Thailand and Cambodia and would likely support ASEAN-led conflict resolution mechanisms. Their goal is to prevent disruption of supply chains and infrastructure projects.
Tensions between Thailand and Cambodia reflect a dangerous interplay of nationalism, historical wounds, and regional power shifts. While full-scale war remains unlikely, the potential for localized hybrid conflict is real—especially amid political instability and foreign power competition. ASEAN’s cohesion, regional development, and the future of Southeast Asia’s security architecture will depend on whether diplomacy, rather than escalation, defines the next chapter of Thai-Cambodian relations.
Strategic Forecast Matrix (6–18 Months)
Introduce a short- to mid-term forecast model based on current drivers:
| Driver | Trend | Likelihood | Impact | Forecast |
| Border militarization | Rising | Medium | Medium | Continued skirmishes, particularly in illegal logging and human trafficking zones. |
| Nationalist rhetoric in media | Intensifying | High | Medium | Both regimes will increasingly use it to deflect domestic instability. |
| Foreign diplomatic interference | Growing (esp. China, US) | High | High | Cambodia more susceptible to Beijing’s maneuvering; Thailand may hedge. |
| ASEAN effectiveness | Weak, ad hoc | High | Low | ASEAN unlikely to mediate unless crisis escalates significantly. |
🧠 2. Risk Assessment of Escalation Pathways
Break down potential escalation by trigger type, including hybrid threats:
| Trigger | Escalation Pathway | Counter-Measure Potential |
| Armed clash over logging/smuggling | Localized firefight ➝ media uproar ➝ troop buildup ➝calls for mediation | High if addressed via joint patrols |
| Anti-Cambodian riots in Thailand | Diplomatic protest ➝ retaliatory mass deportations ➝migrant crisis | Medium via labor MOUs and IOM involvement |
| Disinformation campaigns | Fake news ➝ cyber-operations ➝ diplomatic freeze | Medium–Low, needs digital coordination |
| Political instability in Thailand | Military rule renewal ➝ nationalist focus ➝ Cambodia scapegoated | Low (internal) |
🧭 3. Strategic Forecast Scenarios (12–36 Months)
Frame plausible 3-tier strategic scenarios based on variables like leadership behavior, external influence, and domestic pressures:
Best Case (15% likelihood)
- Thailand stabilizes politically under a democratic compromise.
- Hun Manet, under regional pressure, reduces Chinese dependence.
- ASEAN steps in to facilitate formal border demarcation.
Outcome: Diplomatic thaw and normalized economic ties.
Base Case (65% likelihood)
- Occasional border skirmishes and diplomatic spats.
- Nationalism remains tool for domestic distraction.
- China continues silent backing of Cambodia, while Thailand balances relations.
Outcome: No formal war, but increasing instability at periphery.
Worst Case (20% likelihood)
- Major border incident leads to civilian casualties.
- Both governments mobilize reserves and cancel MOUs.
- China increases its military presence in Cambodia (Ream Naval Base), and U.S. strengthens presence in Thailand.
Outcome: Risk of proxy dynamic developing in mainland Southeast Asia.
🛰️ 4. External Actor Risk Matrix
Evaluate how foreign powers might influence or exploit the conflict:
| Actor | Current Role | Strategic Goal | Potential Action |
| China | Key funder, military partner to Cambodia | Keep Cambodia as loyal proxy, counter U.S. in region | Increase hybrid ops, naval access, surveillance |
| United States | Tilted toward Thailand, cooling on Cambodia | Prevent Chinese domination of Mekong region | Increased military drills, funding border NGOs |
| Vietnam | Watching uneasily | Prevent loss of Cambodian influence to China | Quiet diplomatic pressure, intelligence sharing |
| Japan/Korea | Major investors in both | Protect economic interests | Offer mediation or development packages |
🔚 Conclusion Enhancement: Strategic Recommendations
Conclude with policy-forward recommendations for each stakeholder:
- Thailand: Strengthen anti-corruption in border forces, depoliticize migration issues, and expand economic diplomacy toward Cambodia.
- Cambodia: Avoid overdependence on China, invest in border community development, improve worker conditions abroad.
- ASEAN: Reinvigorate conflict-prevention mechanisms (e.g. ASEAN Regional Forum), and mediate technical border committees.
- Foreign powers: Avoid zero-sum behavior and encourage trilateral Thailand–Cambodia–Vietnam economic cooperation.
