Coup Attempt in Armenia — Kremlin Shadows, Domestic Fractures, and Future Risks for Pashinyan

Executive Summary

The recent coup attempt in Armenia marks the most serious threat to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s authority since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. This event reveals a volatile intersection of pro-Russian elite backlash, disaffected security structures, and geopolitical contestation over Armenia’s alignment between Moscow and the West. While the coup failed, the risks to Armenia’s democratic institutions and sovereignty remain acute. Scenarios and risks of a pro-Russian coup attempt in Armenia have been forecast by us since 2020.(Links below).

1. Key Players Behind the Coup Attempt

A. Retired Military Figures and Nationalist Politicians

Coup instigators included ex-military officers, such as retired generals who had publicly criticized Pashinyan for his handling of the Karabakh conflict and rapprochement with the West.
Alleged involvement of figures linked to the “Hayrenik” (Homeland) Party, which maintains ties to Russia’s United Russia party.

B. Security Service Defectors

Reports indicate participation by mid-ranking officers from the National Security Service (NSS) and some elements of military intelligence, who have resisted Western-oriented reforms.

C. Pro-Russian Oligarchic Circles

Business elites tied to Russian capital flows (banking, energy, infrastructure) are suspected of funding coup coordination.
These circles have lost political influence under Pashinyan’s transparency agenda and see regime change as a path back to power.

2. Russian Links and Possible Involvement

A. Ideological and Personal Connections

Several coup sympathizers have maintained personal ties to Russian military academies, Orthodox networks, and FSB-affiliated “military brotherhoods.”

B. Moscow’s Strategic Motivation

The Kremlin has lost confidence in Pashinyan, especially after:
- Armenia’s withdrawal from CSTO exercises
- Deepening ties with the EU and U.S. (defense, democracy support)
- Hosting Western observers and NATO officials

While there is no conclusive proof of direct Russian command, the ideological alignment, coordination patterns, and propaganda synchronization with Kremlin narratives suggest at least tacit approval or facilitation.

3. Why Now?

A. Collapse of Russia’s Regional Influence

The coup attempt comes after Russia’s failure to support Armenia militarily during Azerbaijani incursions.
As Armenia shifts westward, pro-Russian actors view this as a now-or-never moment to stop irreversible realignment.

B. Domestic Fragility and Elite Panic

Public dissatisfaction over:
- Losses in Karabakh
- Russian betrayal
- Perceived Western hesitation to offer full security guarantees

Pro-Russian elites fear they are being purged — their influence, assets, and relevance are in freefall.

C. International Distraction

The Kremlin may have seen an opening amid global distractions (e.g., U.S. elections, Israel-Gaza war) to reshape Armenia’s trajectory covertly.

🕰️ 4. Historical Precedents

A. 2021 Army Statement

In February 2021, Armenia’s military leadership issued a statement demanding Pashinyan’s resignation. Though no coup followed, it marked the first major attempt to challenge civilian control since independence.

B. Post-Soviet Pattern of Pressure

Russia has previously backed soft coups or destabilization in Georgia (2003–2008), Moldova (2019), and Kyrgyzstan.
Armenia’s strategic geography and political evolution make it a high-value target for the same playbook.

5. Consequences of the Attempt

A. Domestic

Short-term political polarization intensifies
Security reforms may accelerate, with increased vetting of pro-Russian officers
Risk of civil-military fracture remains high

B. International

EU, U.S., and NATO states have condemned the coup attempt — expect increased Western backing for Pashinyan
The CSTO’s irrelevance is now undeniable, possibly pushing Armenia to formalize its exit

C. Russian Blowback

Moscow may escalate hybrid measures:
- Economic sabotage
- Cyberattacks
- Information warfare via Armenian pro-Russian media outlets

6. Future Risks for Pashinyan’s Regime

Risk	Description	Probability	Severity
Renewed Coup Attempt	Possible by reorganized elite-military networks	Medium	High
Kremlin-Backed Destabilization	Economic, cyber, or protest agitation	High	Medium-High
Public Trust Erosion	If reforms falter or security fails	Medium	High
Azerbaijan Escalation	Baku may use Armenian instability to push militarily	Medium	Very High

Conclusion

The attempted coup in Armenia is not merely an internal crisis — it is a proxy battle for Armenia’s future alignment. Pashinyan survived this round, but risks remain high, especially as Moscow’s influence crumbles and desperation grows.

To secure Armenia’s future, his government must:

Deepen security reform
Strengthen alliances with Western democracies
Increase resilience to hybrid threats

Russia and the Armenian Apostolic Church: Strategic Connections

1. Direct Institutional Links

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) enjoy officially warm relations.
Russian officials and church diplomats regularly attend joint interfaith forums, cultural exchanges, and “traditional values” conferences, reinforcing ideological alignment.

These ties serve Kremlin narratives about defending Orthodoxy and resisting Western liberalism.

2. Armenian Church in Russia as a Political Tool

The Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Moscow is highly visible and well-funded.
Clergy are often vetted or co-opted by Russian authorities — through:
- FSB infiltration
- Diplomatic pressure
- Financial subsidies

This gives Moscow indirect leverage over religious messaging and diaspora politics — especially among Armenians in Russia and Georgia.

3. Sympathetic Clergy in Armenia

Certain senior Armenian Church figures in Yerevan and Echmiadzin have expressed criticism of Pashinyan or echoed Russian narratives:
- Denouncing the West
- Opposing CSTO withdrawal
- Calling for “traditional order”

These voices create a cultural and moral counterweight to democratic, pro-European policies.

🛠️ . Church as a Channel for Pro-Russian Elite Messaging

During recent protests and political turmoil:
- Some clerics have implicitly or explicitly supported opposition to Pashinyan.
- The Church has called for “national unity” — often a dog whistle for restoring ties with Moscow.

This positions the Church as a nationalist platform that Russia can exploit during regime-threatening events like coup attempts.

5. Examples of Russian Church-State Soft Power in Action

Event	Religious Role	Political Goal
2020 Karabakh War aftermath	AAC bishops called for “moral renewal” and supported anti-Pashinyan rallies	Reframe defeat as moral-political failure, pressure government
2021 military resignation crisis	Some clergy supported army’s statement against Pashinyan	Amplify legitimacy of “national salvation” framing
2024–25 realignment with West	Church figures warned of “loss of values” and “dangerous Western influence”	Echo Kremlin talking points on spiritual sovereignty

Strategic Assessment

The Armenian Church is not a monolith, but parts of its structure have become vulnerable to Kremlin narratives — especially:

Conservative factions
Church-linked charities receiving Russian aid
Clerics with family or education ties in Russia

For Moscow, the Church is a non-military tool to:

Influence public opinion
Mobilize conservative resistance
Create legitimacy for political alternatives

The most likely Russian intelligence agency behind the coup attempt in Armenia — whether through direct orchestration or indirect facilitation — is the GRU (Main Directorate of the General Staff). However, elements of the FSB and SVR may also play supporting roles in influence, recruitment, and coordination.

Here’s a breakdown of how each agency could be involved, and why the GRU stands out as the primary actor:

1. GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) — Primary Suspect

Why the GRU?

The GRU controls Russian military intelligence operations abroad, including relationships with:
- Former Soviet military elites,
- Intelligence veterans,
- Pro-Russian paramilitary networks,

Methods Used:

Maintaining ties with retired Armenian officers trained in Russian academies
Assisting in covert coordination (secure comms, logistics)
Encouraging military factions to challenge Pashinyan under the guise of restoring order or “national pride”

Precedent:

GRU was behind the failed 2016 coup in Montenegro
Involved in political sabotage in Ukraine before 2014 and in eastern Ukraine during the war

In Armenia, the GRU likely sees pro-Russian generals and disgruntled NSS officers as natural assets for restoring influence.

2. FSB (Federal Security Service) — Domestic Support & Soft Sabotage

Why the FSB?

FSB handles internal counterintelligence and “near abroad” subversion
Manages FSB liaison offices in post-Soviet states, including Armenia

Likely Role:

Infiltrating or influencing Armenia’s National Security Service (NSS)
Supporting media psy-ops and anti-Western disinformation
Facilitating coordination between oligarchic circles and disaffected bureaucrats

FSB’s goal is to foster conditions for instability, but leave military action to the GRU.

3. SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) — Strategic Cover

Why the SVR?

Handles political intelligence and diplomatic cover operations
Interfaces with church networks, Armenian diaspora, and pro-Moscow politicians

Likely Role:

Influencing Armenian Church figures or exiled opposition
Relaying “legal” political support to justify regime change

SVR may have helped shape narratives around “Western betrayal” or Karabakh defeat, feeding the pretext for a coup.

Conclusion: GRU Leads, Others Support

Agency	Primary Role in Coup Context	Key Tools
GRU	Operational coordination, military recruitment	Former generals, secure comms, command ties
FSB	Soft subversion, internal security manipulation	NSS infiltration, disinfo ops, loyalist grooming
SVR	Political cover, church/diaspora influence	Diplomats, church networks, NGO fronts

The GRU’s history of coups, access to military channels, and psychological warfare capabilities make it the most likely architect of the Armenian plot — especially given Russia’s frustration with Pashinyan’s pivot to the West.