An attempt to kill Alexander Dugin, one of the key ‘Russian world’ ideologues, ended up with the death of his daughter Darya, as Kremlin’s pressure groups keep fighting to gain the upper hand.
On August 20, a car blast killed the daughter of Russian pro-government ideologue Alexander Dugin in Moscow.
Alexander Dugin belongs to the pressure group tied to military intelligence. His father was a Soviet GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) general, and Dugin himself was an adviser to Surkov and Naryshkin, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) head, and a member of some advisory boards in the Kremlin. Dugin was an active negotiator between Putin and Turkey.
Darya Dugina was also the one who worked for the GRU, as she:
1. worked for the Tsargrad TV, affiliated with the GRU, and she was a war correspondent, who are usually associated with military intelligence in Russia.
2. actively supported and assisted to the ‘yellow vests’ movement in France, coordinating work between Alain Soral movement and Le Pen, as Russian military intelligence used it to weaken and dismantle the Macron government.
3. created positive image for the Taliban in Russia. Dugina insisted the Taliban were not terrorists and dialogue with them was possible and necessary. The GRU actively supported the Taliban, supplied them with weapons and intelligence data, and was also involved in drug trafficking.
Russian FSB was quick to claim they had solved the murder, not waiting for the findings by Russia’s Investigative Committee, and predictably blamed it on Ukraine. Certain nuances of their findings reveal the investigation was fabricated as part of preparations for a complex game. FSB claims that Natalya Vovk (Shaban), a Ukrainian citizen from Mariupol, executed the murder. It is known, however, that Ms. Vovk is listed in Russian Nemesis database, in sync with the FSB base, as a member of the Azov regiment, recognized as terrorist organization by Russia. FSB claims that Vovk entered Russia on July 23 with her daughter Sophia Shaban, and they rented an apartment in the house where Dugina lived in Moscow. As Dugina’s car was blown up on August 20 in Moscow, they crossed the border into Estonia at Pskov on August 21, having passed 853 km. Accusations against Azov coincide with preparations by Moscow for a show trial of POWs from Mariupol and attempts to accuse Ukraine of terrorism.
Well-known by FSB, Vovk could not enter or leave Russia legally. FSB also claims that Vovk was driving in Moscow using license plates from Kazakhstan, the DPR and Ukraine. It looks absurd, as cars with such plates attract excessive attention in Moscow, especially by traffic police. Ukrainian National Guard ID issued in Vovk family name (where she had never served), allegedly discovered by FSB (taken from the Nemesis base), also points to the fact the investigation was fabricated. It was fabricated with plenty of mistakes, as they used a picture taken not in field uniform, but in dress uniform, which is not common for the Ukrainian National Guard practice.
The FSB conveys the narrative the car was blown up remotely, while that means the perpetrators knew who was driving, with Darya Dugina being the target, therefore.
The FSB investigation claims the perpetrators of the murder drove from Russia to Estonia in a car with Ukrainian registration. It is absurd, on one hand, as it was supposed to attract attention by FSB guards at the border. They would have checked the anti-terror database and found a person driving. However, Estonia, chosen as a country for a murder suspect to enter, provides an excuse for Moscow to put pressure on Tallinn, as it has recently been a leader to initiate anti-Russia sanctions by the European Union (in visa restrictions and energy exports).
The FSB had the opportunity to get a car with Ukrainian registration in the occupied cities of the Donetsk region. Having driven it to Estonia, they will receive confirmation by Estonian border service the car crossed the state border, which will be the only document to confirm the narrative by FSB. Thus, it will become one of the key arguments for Kremlin’s propaganda and political decisions. A senior Russian lawmaker Dzhabarov has already raised the possibility of tough action against Tallinn. Russia is interested in opening a second front in Europe.
The FSB investigation findings have already been criticized even in Russia.
We believe Darya Dugina murder was staged by FSB as part of a years-old standoff between the FSB and Russian military intelligence. That standoff has already resulted in the murder of some GRU officers (Orkhan Dzhemal, Alexander Rastoruev and Kirill Radchenko who worked under cover of military journalists in the Central African Republic).
GRU ideologues are under pressure, as Margarita Simonyan, who heads Russia Today group and is affiliated with the GRU, announced she has started using close protection team.
Our hypothesis suggests the FSB group led by Patrushev has launched fighting against information asset of military intelligence.
GRU’s information asset not just demands too much funding, but also becomes an independent player in Russian politics, as it shapes the politics, produces its own narratives that require feedback by President Putin, and sometimes creates the illusion of influencing his worldview, calling his ability to produce ideological narratives into question. As for Dugin, Russian media have repeatedly stated that it was Dugin who influenced Putin’s ideology. These views irritate the Presidential Administration, as they require to consider the Kremlin’s policy in terms of philosophy that is something between traditionalism and fascism. The FSB group does not understand philosophy in policymaking, as it is used to operating within the universal ideology of the Cold War. Moreover, the FSB, like Putin, believe that sophisticated narrative by the GRU information asset was the reason for Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine to fail, as civilians did not support it there.
As the Kremlin, amid a transfer of power and major failures in the war against Ukraine, is looking for new narratives, those ideologues become toxic. That means the group affiliated with the GRU will remain under pressure that might become even tougher. This group will make an attempt to go all-in, in turn, raising the stakes in the race for power.
The Kremlin is likely to take further advantage of Dugina murder to fulfill several purposes:
• casus belli, like explosions of residential buildings in Russia, the FSB, led by Patrushev, staged in 1999 to trigger a war against the Republic of Ichkeria. Blowing up a car was actively used by the FSB as a method to kill, starting with the murder of Yandarbiev in Doha, ending with the murder of Ukrainian security officials in the Donbas.
• to add more evidence for a show trial of Ukrainian POWs.
• to put pressure on Estonia.
• an argument for calling on the West to reduce or stop military aid to Ukraine.• intensified strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine.
