The intensification of activity by the Russian disinformation network ‘Matryoshka’ in Spain’s information environment may indicate an attempt by the Kremlin to exploit political uncertainty, economic discontent, and regional divisions to weaken support for Ukraine and undermine European Union unity.
What distinguishes this campaign is that it goes beyond spreading anti-Ukrainian messages. Its narratives advocate a radical restructuring of Europe’s political landscape: Spain’s withdrawal from the EU, Catalan independence, and the renewed division of Germany.
The principal strategic objective of such an information operation is not necessarily to secure victory for a particular political force, but to weaken European states’ ability to make coordinated decisions concerning Russia, Ukraine, and their own security.
At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish the established characteristics of the ‘Matryoshka’ network, reports about this particular campaign, and analytical assumptions about its organizers and effectiveness. In particular, the date of Spain’s parliamentary elections—November 29, 2026—requires separate confirmation: the next election following the 2023 vote was not automatically scheduled for that date.
From Anti-Ukrainian Propaganda to Europe’s Political Disintegration
The campaign described is built around the purported causal claim that support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia have become the main causes of economic hardship in European countries.
This narrative serves two functions:
Shifting responsibility for economic problems from Russian aggression to European policies intended to counter it. In this way, the Kremlin seeks to reshape public perceptions of the war: Ukraine is portrayed not as a victim of aggression in need of support, but as a financial burden on European taxpayers.
Fostering the belief that democratic mechanisms for changing governments cannot improve citizens’ circumstances. According to the campaign’s logic, even the victory of another political party will make no difference as long as the country remains part of Europe’s sanctions policy.
This is an important distinction from ordinary election-related disinformation. The objective is not only to discredit the incumbent government, but also to undermine confidence in democratic institutions’ very capacity to solve societal problems.
Against this backdrop, radical proposals—withdrawal from the EU, separatism, or the redrawing of national borders—are presented as supposedly logical alternatives.
Yet the causal relationship promoted by Russian propaganda is misleading. Europe’s economic difficulties have multiple causes, including energy shocks, inflation, budgetary constraints, structural problems, and the consequences of Russia’s war itself. The claim that lifting sanctions would automatically resolve these problems lacks adequate economic justification.
Why Spain Is of Particular Interest to the Kremlin
Spain is an attractive target for information influence for several reasons.
First, it is one of the larger EU and NATO member states and helps shape common European policy toward Russia. A decline in its willingness to support sanctions or assistance to Ukraine could complicate the formation of a unified EU position.
Second, Spain’s political system is characterized by the significant role of regional parties, coalition arrangements, and territorial disputes. This creates an information environment in which an external actor may seek to amplify existing conflicts.
Third, the Catalan question carries considerable emotional and historical significance. The Kremlin does not need to invent a separatist conflict from scratch; it need only attempt to exploit existing political identities and mutual distrust.
Fourth, Spain could serve as an information platform for reaching a broader Spanish-speaking audience. Potentially, this would allow anti-European and anti-Ukrainian narratives to spread beyond the EU, including into Latin America.
Three Scenarios of Disintegration: Why Moscow Links Spain, Catalonia, and Germany
The combination of three geographically and politically distinct themes may not be accidental. It could reflect an effort to advance a common idea: that existing European national and supranational institutions have allegedly lost the ability to protect citizens’ interests.
| Campaign narrative | Likely political objective | Potential effect |
| Spain’s withdrawal from the EU | Discrediting European integration | Strengthening Eurosceptic sentiment |
| Catalan independence | Aggravating territorial disputes | Polarization between Madrid and regional movements |
| Renewed division of Germany | Delegitimizing the post–Cold War European order | Intensifying historical and regional divisions |
The most revealing element is the call to divide Germany again. Unlike the Catalan question, which has a genuine political history, restoring two German states is not a realistic short-term political prospect.
Its inclusion in the campaign may serve a different purpose: normalizing the very idea of dismantling Europe’s present political order.
For the Kremlin, this framing also carries symbolic significance. German reunification, NATO enlargement, and Central Europe’s integration into Western institutions are all elements of the political order that emerged after the Cold War.
Calls for a new division of Germany may therefore serve as an information instrument for revising that order.
Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that Moscow genuinely expects Germany to break apart or Catalonia to secede. It is more plausible that such messages are used to expand the boundaries of acceptable political debate, provoke emotional responses, and test audience receptiveness.
Forged Reuters, AFP, and El País Content as a Means of Legitimizing Russian Narratives
The use of forged materials made to resemble reporting by Reuters, AFP, Euronews, France 24, and El País is one of the operation’s most important components.
This tactic relies on the transfer of trust: a user sees a familiar logo, the presentation of a news report, or the cover of a respected publication and may mistake fabricated content for authentic journalism.
The mechanism may unfold in several stages: a fake news item is created using the visual elements of a well-known outlet; a network of coordinated accounts distributes it initially; artificial views and reposts create the appearance of public interest; the item may then reach alternative media, political bloggers, or activist communities; and, following secondary distribution, its original provenance becomes less apparent.
The fourth stage is the most dangerous. It is at this point that an artificially created information product may move from a controlled bot network into genuine political debate.
In such a case, even a relatively small operation can generate a disproportionately large information effect.
Another objective is to undermine trust in professional media. When citizens repeatedly encounter fabrications that resemble genuine news, they may begin to question not only individual reports but also the reliability of journalism as a whole.
This creates favorable conditions for conspiracy theories, political cynicism, and distrust of official sources.
Why Limited Reach Does Not Necessarily Mean a Low Threat
Assessing an information operation solely by its view count can lead to misleading conclusions.
It is important to distinguish three indicators: reach, engagement, and actual impact.
Reach describes the number of users who may have seen a message. Engagement measures interaction with the content. Actual impact means a change in beliefs, political behavior, or decisions.
These indicators are not interchangeable. Millions of artificial views do not prove a change in public opinion, whereas a single item amplified by an influential politician may have a far greater effect than hundreds of bot posts.
The key indicator of ‘Matryoshka’s’ effectiveness is therefore not the number of fabricated items it produces, but their penetration into authentic political and media environments.
At the same time, limited reach should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of hidden success. In the absence of verified cases of secondary dissemination, changes in public opinion, or influence on political decisions, the effectiveness of the specific campaign remains unestablished.
This distinction is fundamental to professional analysis of information operations.
Who Might Coordinate the Operation: Russian Intelligence Services or the Kremlin’s Political Apparatus?
Attributing the operation requires distinguishing between the strategic sponsor, operational coordinator, and technical implementers.
In its orientation, the campaign aligns with the interests of Russia’s leadership: weakening support for Ukraine, discrediting sanctions, and deepening internal divisions within the EU.
However, the alignment of information narratives with Kremlin objectives does not automatically identify a particular Russian intelligence unit as directing the campaign.
It is useful to consider three potential organizational levels.
Strategic level — Russia’s political leadership. The Russian Presidential Administration and affiliated structures may define the general priorities for information influence against European states. At this level, the main objective is to create political conditions conducive to weakening European support for Ukraine.
Operational level — information-influence structures and affiliated contractors. They may be responsible for tailoring narratives to specific countries, preparing materials, coordinating accounts, and timing information attacks.
Technical level — bot networks, account operators, and producers of fabricated content. Their role is to create fake videos, covers, and news reports and ensure their artificial amplification.
Without technical data, financial links, participant testimony, or documentary evidence, claims that a particular intelligence service directly controls the campaign remain hypothetical.
The Electoral Dimension: Why the Timing of the Campaign Matters
The date of Spain’s parliamentary elections—November 29, 2026—has been confirmed by Royal Decree No. 806/2026 of October 5. The official election campaign begins on November 13 and ends on November 27. Approximately 38.7 million citizens are eligible to vote.
Accordingly, the earlier caveat about the unconfirmed election date was withdrawn following a review of official sources.
Reports about the new ‘Matryoshka’ campaign have also received independent corroboration: on November 11, The Insider published findings from an AntiBot4Navalny investigation. Researchers documented forged content attributed to Euronews, Reuters, AFP, France 24, and El País, as well as fake covers of the French publications Libération, La Croix, and Le Nouvel Économiste.
Launching the operation immediately before the official election campaign could offer its organizers several advantages.
First, it allows them to introduce selected messages into the information environment before election activity reaches its peak.
Second, during elections, political parties, journalists, and voters pay greater attention to economic and social problems—the very issues exploited in Russian narratives.
Third, the high intensity of political debate increases the likelihood that fabricated materials will be shared without proper verification.
Nevertheless, there are currently insufficient grounds to claim that this campaign could substantially change the outcome of Spain’s elections. It is more reasonable to assess it as an attempt to influence the information environment and political agenda.
Recommendations for Spain and the European Union
Countering operations such as ‘Matryoshka’ should focus not only on removing individual fake posts, but also on identifying and documenting the coordinated infrastructure used to disseminate them.
The relevant Spanish authorities should strengthen cooperation with social media platforms, independent researchers of information operations, and news organizations whose visual identities are being misused to create forgeries.
Particularly important is the rapid debunking of fabricated materials by the news agencies themselves. Such rebuttals should include verifiable indicators of falsification, rather than merely general statements about disinformation.
At EU level, the exchange of technical indicators of coordinated inauthentic behavior should be strengthened, including information about account networks, recurring video templates, and synchronized content distribution.
Another priority should be protecting the electoral process without restricting legitimate political debate. Euroscepticism, criticism of sanctions, or support for Catalan independence are not, in themselves, indicators of Russian interference. Countermeasures should target covert foreign operations, source impersonation, and coordinated manipulation of the information environment.
The intensification of ‘Matryoshka’ activity ahead of Spain’s parliamentary elections illustrates how Russian information operations can combine economic discontent, anti-Ukrainian narratives, Euroscepticism, and territorial disputes into a single campaign of political destabilization.
The most important feature of the operation described is that it targets not only specific policies supporting Ukraine, but also trust in European institutions and democratic states’ ability to resolve domestic problems.
Calls for Spain to leave the EU, for Catalonia to separate, and for Germany to be divided again point to an attempt to present disintegration scenarios as acceptable responses to economic difficulties.
The strategic danger lies less in the possibility of directly changing Spain’s election results than in the gradual penetration of Russian narratives into Europe’s legitimate political discourse.
If fabricated messages begin to be repeated systematically by influential political actors, Russia could achieve some of its information objectives even without extensive direct reach from bot networks.For the EU, the central task is not to suppress political differences but to protect the democratic process from covert external manipulation. The ability to distinguish legitimate political competition from coordinated foreign operations will determine the effectiveness of Europe’s response to Russian information influence.
