Cabo Verde will hold its presidential election on November 15, 2026, with a second round scheduled for November 29 if no candidate secures an absolute majority. The election comes six months after a significant political transition: the African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV) defeated the Movement for Democracy (MpD) in May’s parliamentary election, ending a decade of MpD-led government.
The presidential contest will therefore take place in a substantially altered political environment. PAICV now controls the government under Prime Minister Francisco Carvalho, while incumbent President José Maria Neves, historically associated with PAICV, is seeking another five-year term. Six presidential candidacies have been formally admitted.
The election’s significance extends beyond domestic politics. Cabo Verde occupies a strategically important position in the Atlantic between West Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Its political stability, maritime jurisdiction, and international partnerships make it relevant to transatlantic security, counternarcotics cooperation, migration, and growing competition for diplomatic and economic influence in Africa.
The election will test Cabo Verde’s political balance after the May 2026 change of government. The relationship between the presidency and the PAICV-led cabinet will influence institutional coordination, public accountability, and foreign-policy continuity.
Economic performance is a central political issue. Tourism-driven growth contrasts with persistent poverty, dependence on external markets, and vulnerability to energy prices and international shocks.The country has strategic value disproportionate to its population and economic size. Its Atlantic location makes maritime security, fisheries, transport, and international infrastructure partnerships important elements of foreign relations.
. Foreign influence is principally a question of economic and diplomatic relationships. Portugal, the European Union, the United States, and China have different interests in Cabo Verde. Evidence of legitimate foreign engagement should not be confused with evidence of covert electoral interference.
Organized crime is a significant national security concern. Cabo Verde’s location near transatlantic trafficking corridors creates incentives for criminal networks to exploit maritime and commercial vulnerabilities.
6. The principal post-election questions concern institutional cooperation and policy implementation. The presidency’s relationship with parliament and the government will matter for the country’s international commitments and domestic reform agenda.
Political Environment: A New Balance of Power
Cabo Verde is one of West Africa’s established multiparty democracies, with a political system historically dominated by PAICV and MpD.
The May 17, 2026 parliamentary election changed the governing balance. PAICV secured 37 seats in the 72-member National Assembly, compared with 33 for MpD and two for the Democratic and Independent Cape Verdean Union (UCID). Francisco Carvalho subsequently became prime minister on June 19.
National Assembly composition after May 2026
PAICV: 37,
MpD: 33,
UCID: 2.
The parliamentary result was accompanied by voter turnout of just 46.5%, highlighting the importance of political participation and the challenge of engaging citizens who remain outside the electoral process.
The transition was conducted through established democratic procedures, with international observers and analysts noting the orderly conduct of the election and acceptance of the results.
For the November presidential election, the central political question is how the presidency will function alongside a newly elected parliamentary majority. Although the president does not directly manage daily economic policy, the office carries important constitutional, representative, and institutional responsibilities.
A president politically associated with the governing party could facilitate coordination, while a president with a different political background could introduce additional institutional scrutiny. Neither arrangement necessarily determines the quality of governance; much depends on the conduct of officeholders and constitutional practice.
Principal Political Actors and Presidential Candidates
The National Election Commission has confirmed six candidates. Two have explicit support from the country’s principal political parties, while four are standing as independents.
Mr. José Maria Pereira Neves – REBRANDING AFRICA FORUM
José Maria Neves — Incumbent president
Supported by PAICV
Former prime minister from 2001 to 2016 and president since 2021. His candidacy emphasizes continuity in the presidency following the recent change in parliamentary leadership. His relationship with the PAICV government is an important factor in assessing future executive coordination.
Joana Rosa — Former justice minister- Supported by MpD
An experienced parliamentarian and former justice minister. Her campaign presents institutional balance as a central theme following PAICV’s parliamentary victory. She is also the first woman to participate in Cabo Verde’s presidential election, according to national reporting.
The four independent candidates bring professional backgrounds outside the two principal party structures.
| Candidate | Background | Political significance |
| Casimiro de Pina | Jurist and academic; previously ran in 2021 | Constitutional interpretation and institutional reform |
| Antero Tavares | Judge | Judicial independence and constitutional governance |
| Gilson Alves | Physician; previously ran in 2021 | Alternative representation outside the main parties |
| Loisito Tavares de Sousa | Teacher | Independent candidacy admitted following a Constitutional Court appeal |
The independent candidacies broaden the political debate. Their impact on participation and the possibility of a runoff will depend on actual voting patterns; reliable evidence does not yet establish how much support each will attract.
The diaspora as a political actor
Cabo Verde’s substantial diaspora is an important element of the electoral system. September registration figures recorded approximately 426,531 voters, including 76,898 abroad—about 18% of the electorate.
This creates an international dimension to an otherwise domestic contest. Communities in Portugal, the United States, and other countries maintain political and economic connections with the islands through remittances, investment, and family networks.
Economic Situation: Growth Without Full Economic Security
Cabo Verde enters the election with strong headline economic growth but significant structural vulnerabilities.
According to the World Bank, GDP grew 6.4% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026, supported by tourism and investment. Tourist arrivals approached 380,000 during that quarter, following a record 1.25 million arrivals in 2025.
Nevertheless, poverty remains widespread, public debt is high, and economic performance depends heavily on tourism and external demand.
Economic indicators shaping the 2026 election
2026 GDP growth forecast: 5.3%
2026 public debt forecast: 93.9%
Share of GDP
2026 poverty forecast: 54.2%
Upper-middle-income poverty line
2025 tourist arrivals: 1.25M
World Bank estimates and forecasts; the poverty measure uses an international benchmark and is not the national poverty rate.
Principal economic vulnerabilities
Tourism dependence. Cabo Verde’s growth depends heavily on visitors from Europe. An economic slowdown in major European markets, disruption of international aviation, or higher travel costs could weaken revenues and employment.
Public debt and fiscal pressure. The World Bank projects public debt near 94% of GDP in 2026, despite a declining trajectory. The government’s ability to expand public services while maintaining fiscal stability remains constrained.
Energy dependence. Imported fuel exposes the country to international price volatility. Government measures to limit fuel-price increases may protect consumers but create fiscal costs.
Poverty and unequal opportunity. Growth in tourism does not automatically translate into broad-based improvements in household incomes. Employment opportunities, living costs, education, and access to public services remain important political concerns.
Climate vulnerability. Water scarcity, drought, coastal exposure, and the cost of climate adaptation create additional long-term development pressures.
The IMF has emphasized debt reduction, financial-sector resilience, and reforms to strengthen fiscal sustainability. These priorities can create tension with demands for immediate improvements in public services and living standards.
The president’s direct economic powers are limited compared with those of the government. Nevertheless, the presidency can influence national priorities, institutional debate, and the international presentation of Cabo Verde’s development agenda.
Foreign Influence: China, the European Union, and the United States
Cabo Verde’s external relations are characterized by cooperation with multiple partners rather than exclusive alignment with one geopolitical bloc.
The strategic question surrounding the presidential election is whether the next administration will maintain this diversified approach and how the country will manage the security and economic implications of foreign investment.
China: Expanding economic and institutional influence
China has substantially developed its relationship with Cabo Verde, particularly in infrastructure, energy, water management, education, and technology.
The two countries established a strategic partnership in September 2024. Cooperation has expanded further during 2026: In August, Cabo Verde signed a memorandum of understanding with China Machinery Engineering Corporation covering energy, water, agriculture, and development of the northern islands. In September, the two governments signed a framework agreement to deepen economic and trade cooperation. In August, they also concluded an agreement covering broadcasting, online audiovisual content, and professional training for media personnel.
These developments are significant because they extend Chinese engagement beyond conventional infrastructure projects into sectors relevant to communications, economic planning, and national development.
President José Maria Neves has publicly described China as one of Cabo Verde’s principal development partners. Importantly, China also maintained strong relations with the preceding MpD government, indicating that bilateral cooperation is not confined to one political party.
Analytical assessment: China’s growing economic presence may create long-term influence through financing, technical cooperation, institutional relationships, and infrastructure management. However, the available evidence does not establish that Beijing is directing any presidential candidate or conducting a covert operation to determine the election’s outcome.
Particular attention should be paid to the transparency of infrastructure financing, data governance, and the terms of cooperation in strategic sectors.
European Union and Portugal: Economic integration and maritime security
The EU remains Cabo Verde’s principal trade partner and an important source of investment, development assistance, and institutional cooperation.
The EU–Cabo Verde Special Partnership, established in 2007, encompasses governance, migration, economic development, and security.
At the October 2026 ministerial meeting, both sides reaffirmed cooperation on maritime security, renewable energy, port modernization, digital infrastructure, and sustainable development.
The EU also highlighted a second European Peace Facility package worth €60 million in 2026, intended to strengthen maritime security cooperation.
Portugal’s historical, linguistic, commercial, and diaspora relationships give it an enduring role in Cabo Verde’s international affairs.
For European governments, the presidential election matters primarily because of the continuity of security cooperation and the management of investments in strategically relevant infrastructure.
United States: Maritime security and counternarcotics cooperation
Washington’s principal interests include Atlantic maritime security, transnational organized crime, institutional stability, and cooperation with African partners.
Cabo Verde has participated in joint maritime operations and U.S.-supported security initiatives. In July 2026, U.S. naval leadership met representatives of the Cabo Verde Coast Guard to discuss maritime governance, professional development, and regional cooperation.
The country’s strategic importance is illustrated by a 2022 joint U.S.–Cabo Verdean operation that seized approximately six metric tons of suspected cocaine from a vessel in Atlantic waters.
For Washington, maintaining effective cooperation with Cabo Verde is relevant to countering transatlantic trafficking networks and strengthening maritime governance.
Comparative foreign interests
| External actor | Principal interests | Strategic considerations |
| China | Infrastructure, trade, energy, digital and media cooperation | Transparency, economic dependencies, technology governance |
| European Union | Maritime security, trade, migration, development | Institutional continuity, border security, regulatory cooperation |
| Portugal | Economic, cultural, political and diaspora relations | Bilateral coordination and European engagement |
| United States | Counternarcotics, maritime security, defense cooperation | Intelligence-sharing and Atlantic security |
| Brazil | Lusophone relations, commerce and Atlantic cooperation | Maritime law enforcement and transnational organized crime |
These relationships are not inherently mutually exclusive. Cabo Verde has historically sought to benefit from cooperation with multiple international partners.
Security Environment: Drug Trafficking and Atlantic Vulnerabilities
Cabo Verde’s position in the Atlantic creates both economic opportunities and security challenges.
The country lies near maritime corridors used by international trafficking networks transporting cocaine from Latin America toward West Africa and Europe.
The expansion of Latin American criminal organizations into Africa raises concerns that traffickers may seek to exploit ports, maritime services, financial institutions, and local intermediaries.
The U.S. State Department has identified Cabo Verde’s extensive maritime borders and strategic location as factors contributing to its exposure to narcotics trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime.
Three issues deserve particular attention.
First, maritime surveillance capacity. Cabo Verde must monitor a large maritime area with comparatively limited resources. International cooperation remains important for detecting and investigating trafficking activity.
Second, criminal penetration of legitimate commerce. International trafficking networks may attempt to exploit commercial structures or corrupt individual officials. This is a risk requiring investigation, not evidence that Cabo Verde’s political institutions are controlled by cartels.
Third, the relationship between infrastructure and security. Ports, telecommunications systems, and maritime information networks have commercial and security significance. Foreign investment in these sectors should be assessed through transparent regulatory and procurement procedures.
The presidential election is therefore relevant to security cooperation, although operational responsibility for most law-enforcement activities remains with the government and specialized agencies.
Possible Political and Strategic Consequences
The following scenarios describe different institutional configurations without predicting which candidate will be elected.
| Scenario | Domestic consequences | International implications |
| José Maria Neves secures another term | Continuity in the presidency alongside a PAICV parliamentary majority | Continued diplomatic relationships and potential policy coordination |
| Joana Rosa is elected | Presidency supported by MpD alongside a PAICV-led government | Greater emphasis on institutional balance; specific foreign-policy changes would depend on announced positions |
| An independent candidate is elected | Presidency without the direct support of either major party | Greater importance of cross-party negotiation and constitutional coordination |
| Election proceeds to a runoff | Extended campaigning and further competition for voter support | Longer period of electoral observation, with no automatic implication of instability |
| Electoral disputes emerge | Potential judicial review and heightened institutional scrutiny | International attention to electoral procedures and acceptance of results |
The institutional implications will depend not only on the identity of the president but also on cooperation with parliament, judicial decisions, and the government’s policy agenda.
Cabo Verde’s November 2026 presidential election takes place during an important period of political and economic adjustment.
The recent parliamentary transition has changed the country’s governing balance, while tourism dependence, high public debt, and social vulnerabilities continue to shape domestic policy.
Internationally, Cabo Verde is becoming increasingly relevant to Atlantic maritime security and economic cooperation. China is expanding its commercial and institutional engagement, while the EU and United States maintain substantial interests in development, governance, and security.
The available evidence points to established foreign partnerships rather than a verified foreign campaign to manipulate the election.
The central strategic issue is how Cabo Verde’s next president will exercise constitutional responsibilities while preserving institutional stability, managing relations with competing international partners, and supporting the country’s capacity to address economic and maritime security challenges.The election will provide an important test of democratic continuity following the May 2026 parliamentary transition.
