An analysis of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party program in Saxony-Anhalt identified a risk of an annual deficit of at least €2.2 billion. In total, researchers counted 136 measures announced by the party that would require substantial expenditure, while the savings envisaged by the party amount to only around €250 million. According to their estimates, the funding gap would amount to approximately €1,000 per resident of the state, or 25% of all annual state tax revenues, which total approximately €15 billion. R. Gropp, president of the economic research institute, described such promises as a “castle in the air,” since the AfD program simultaneously rules out both tax increases and new government borrowing. The absence of realistic funding to cover the expenditures makes the proposed economic plans financially unfeasible.
An analysis of the AfD’s economic program in Saxony-Anhalt identified the risk of an annual budget deficit of at least €2.2 billion. This points to the populist nature of the party’s promises, since implementing them without raising taxes or taking on new government debt would inevitably require cuts to other expenditures and impose an additional financial burden on the region’s residents.
The AfD’s election program is built around promises intended to secure voter support but does not take sufficient account of the practical possibilities for implementing them.
This approach points to political irresponsibility on the part of the AfD leadership, which deliberately offers voters attractive solutions while withholding their potential consequences for the region. In effect, the party uses economic promises as an instrument of political mobilization, shifting the risks associated with their non-implementation onto the voters themselves.
An analysis of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) election program in Saxony-Anhalt points to a substantial mismatch between the scale of the expenditures announced by the party and the proposed sources of funding. Implementing the program could generate an annual deficit of at least €2.2 billion. Researchers identified 136 measures involving additional budget expenditures, while the potential savings incorporated into the AfD program amount to only around €250 million.
The scale of the potential imbalance is significant for the state budget. On a per-capita basis, the deficit would amount to approximately €1,000 for every resident of the state. At the same time, the AfD rules out two traditional mechanisms for closing such a gap: raising taxes and increasing government borrowing. It was precisely this contradiction that led Reint Gropp, president of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), to describe the proposed model as a “castle in the air.”
The central problem with the program, therefore, lies not only in the high cost of individual promises but also in the absence of a credible mechanism for financing them. If the AfD were to come to power, the state government would effectively be forced to choose between abandoning some of its election promises, cutting other areas of the budget, finding additional sources of revenue, or revising its stated position on borrowing.
This creates a risk that the greatest pressure would fall on the state’s discretionary spending, including infrastructure projects, regional development programs, education, culture, support for municipalities, and other areas that do not enjoy the same degree of political protection. The potential impact of the program should therefore be assessed more broadly than simply in terms of a budget deficit: its implementation could alter the structure of public expenditure and intensify competition among social, investment, and administrative priorities.
At the same time, the program’s financial contradictions do not necessarily reduce its electoral effectiveness. On the contrary, the AfD may use its economic promises primarily as an instrument of political mobilization. Combining promises to increase support for particular groups with a commitment to maintaining a low tax burden allows the party to offer voters a politically attractive model without immediately having to explain the trade-offs required to implement it.
In this context, the economic program serves at least two functions. First, it broadens the AfD’s agenda beyond the issues traditionally associated with the party, including migration, security, and criticism of the federal government. Second, it allows the AfD to position itself as an alternative to the established parties on socioeconomic policy, particularly among voters dissatisfied with income levels, the condition of infrastructure, and the economic prospects of Germany’s eastern states.
The key political risk, therefore, lies less in whether all 136 promises can literally be implemented than in the possibility that a program with weak budgetary foundations may remain politically effective until the AfD assumes actual responsibility for drafting a budget. The transition from opposition rhetoric to governing would confront the party with a dilemma: abandon some of its promises and suffer reputational damage, or undertake a substantial restructuring of expenditures, effectively shifting the cost of its election program onto other areas of regional policy.
The identified €2.2 billion deficit should be viewed as an indicator of a structural contradiction in the AfD’s economic platform in Saxony-Anhalt: the party simultaneously promises to expand or maintain substantial public spending, limit the tax burden, and reject new debt financing. Such a model would be difficult to implement without a significant revision of budget priorities. At the same time, this very contradiction may form part of the AfD’s electoral strategy: maximizing the political appeal of its promises before the election while postponing questions about their actual cost and the necessary trade-offs until after a possible accession to power.
This should not be interpreted solely as a problem for the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt. However, it is important to distinguish between two issues: the specific €2.2 billion deficit has been established for the AfD program in Saxony-Anhalt, whereas claims of a comparable deficit in other German states would require separate calculations.
The IWH study is particularly compelling because its methodology is conservative: of the 136 spending measures proposed by the AfD, economists were able to quantify only 28. Even these would generate approximately €1.6 billion in additional expenditure; combined with the deficit financing already envisaged, the total funding requirement would reach approximately €2.5 billion, while confirmed savings amount to only around €243 million. Consequently, the €2.2 billion figure effectively represents a lower-bound rather than a maximum estimate of the funding gap. (tagesschau.de)
There are, however, grounds for viewing this as evidence of a broader structural problem in the AfD’s economic model at the state level. In Saxony, for example, the AfD simultaneously takes a categorical position against new debt while arguing that the budget can be balanced through radical cuts to “unnecessary” public spending. Saxony’s 2025–2026 budget exceeds €50 billion, with a substantial share allocated to education, municipal financing, social services, infrastructure, and other major structural expenditure categories. Converting political declarations about cutting “ideological” programs into billions of euros in actual savings is therefore considerably more difficult than election rhetoric suggests.
This issue is particularly relevant to Germany’s eastern states. The AfD is effectively attempting to combine three politically attractive but fiscally conflicting principles: increasing or maintaining social benefits and support for families; rejecting tax increases; and limiting new debt. A fourth source of financing is supposed to come from cuts in spending on migration, climate policy, NGOs, and administrative structures. The problem is that the potential savings in these areas may be substantially smaller than the cost of the new commitments.
The €2.2 billion deficit identified in Saxony-Anhalt is not merely a local error by the AfD’s state organization but potentially reflects a broader contradiction within the party’s economic model. The AfD seeks simultaneously to expand socially oriented spending, avoid tax increases, and limit government borrowing, expecting to offset the difference primarily by cutting expenditure on migration, climate policy, and selected government programs. However, the Saxony-Anhalt case demonstrates that the savings available from these areas may be insufficient to finance the commitments being made. This creates a risk of similar budgetary imbalances if comparable AfD policies are implemented in other states, particularly in eastern Germany. At the same time, without separate cost analyses of the AfD programs in Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg, it would be incorrect to claim that these states already face deficits comparable to the €2.2 billion gap identified in Saxony-Anhalt.
Saxony-Anhalt may also serve as a test of the AfD’s economic capacity for actual governance. If the party gains an opportunity to form a government there, the central question will no longer be whether its promises are popular, but which expenditures it will cut when the projected savings prove insufficient. This will make it possible to assess whether the AfD has a viable alternative budget model or whether the economic component of its program primarily serves an electoral mobilization function.
The budget deficit issue should not be interpreted exclusively as a problem for the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt. The specific €2.2 billion deficit has been established for the AfD program in Saxony-Anhalt, whereas claims of a similar deficit in other states require separate calculations.
The IWH study is particularly persuasive precisely because it is conservative: of the 136 AfD spending measures, economists were able to quantify only 28. Even these amount to approximately €1.6 billion in additional expenditure; combined with the deficit financing already envisaged, the funding requirement reaches approximately €2.5 billion, while confirmed savings total only around €243 million. The €2.2 billion figure is therefore effectively a lower-bound rather than a maximum estimate of the gap.
There are nevertheless grounds for identifying a broader structural problem in the AfD’s economic model at the state level. In Saxony, for example, the AfD simultaneously takes a categorical position against new debt and argues that the budget can be balanced through radical cuts to “unnecessary” public spending. Saxony’s budget for 2025–2026 exceeds €50 billion, a substantial share of which is allocated to education, municipal financing, social services, infrastructure, and other major structural spending categories. Transforming political declarations about cutting “ideological” programs into billions of euros in savings is therefore considerably more difficult than election rhetoric suggests.
This is particularly relevant to the eastern states. The AfD is effectively attempting to combine three politically attractive but fiscally conflicting principles: increasing or maintaining social benefits and support for families, rejecting tax increases, and limiting new debt. A fourth source of financing is supposed to come from cuts in spending on migration, climate policy, NGOs, and administrative structures. The problem is that the potential savings in these areas may be substantially smaller than the cost of the new commitments.
The €2.2 billion deficit identified in Saxony-Anhalt is not merely a local error by the AfD’s state organization but potentially reflects a broader contradiction in the party’s economic model. The AfD seeks simultaneously to expand socially oriented expenditure, avoid tax increases, and limit government borrowing, expecting to compensate for the difference primarily through cuts in spending on migration, climate policy, and selected government programs.
The discovery of the deficit creates a serious vulnerability for the AfD, but it is unlikely by itself to substantially reduce the party’s result in the September 6, 2026 election. Support for the party did not collapse after economists published their criticism. In late July, Infratest dimap put the AfD at 41%, while the latest Pollytix poll placed it at 43%, compared with 23% for the CDU.
The €2.2 billion deficit is unlikely to be sufficient to trigger a mass exodus from the AfD’s existing core electorate. The IWH found that just 28 of the 136 measures that could be reliably quantified would cost approximately €1.6 billion per year; according to the institute, the budget of a potential AfD government would face a shortfall of at least €2.2 billion. (iwh-halle.de)
However, support for the AfD is driven to a considerable extent by factors other than confidence in detailed budget calculations. More powerful drivers remain dissatisfaction with the federal and state governments, migration, the economic problems of eastern Germany, and a sense of the region’s political marginalization. Reuters has also noted that economists’ warnings have so far failed to halt the rise in support for the AfD.
Before the election, the party may therefore be able to shift the debate successfully from the question “Where will the €2.2 billion come from?” to “What is the current government spending money on incorrectly?” This is considerably more favorable political terrain for the AfD.
The greatest danger is not to the party’s polling numbers, but to its image as a “party ready to govern”
The consequences are considerably more serious in this respect. In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD is effectively moving from the role of a protest force to that of a contender for power. Recent polls put the party at 41–43%, roughly twice the level of support for the CDU.
As a result, the standard by which the AfD is judged is changing.
When a party receives 15–20% support, voters may view its program primarily as a declaration of political priorities. When a party approaches 40% or more, a different question arises: is it actually capable of forming a government and managing a budget?
This is where the €2.2 billion gap becomes politically dangerous. The CDU and other competitors gain an opportunity to attack the AfD not only as a radical party, but also as a party economically unprepared for government.
The vulnerable group is not the AfD’s core electorate, but potential new voters
This issue may have its greatest impact on voters who are considering switching from the CDU, SPD, BSW, or abstention to the AfD, but for whom economic stability and governmental competence remain important.
Business owners, segments of the middle class, public-sector employees, municipal officials, and older voters may be particularly sensitive. For these groups, the €2.2 billion issue can be transformed from an abstract macroeconomic figure into a concrete question:
“Which specific area of the budget will the AfD cut in order to fulfill its promises?”
This is considerably more dangerous for the party than a simple accusation of populism.
Paradoxically, however, the AfD may be able to turn the criticism to its advantage
The AfD leadership may portray the IWH findings as an attack by the economic and political establishment against a party seeking to take power.
AfD candidate Ulrich Siegmund has already challenged the logic of the critics, pointing, among other things, to the possibility of reducing migration-related expenditure. Economists, however, note that a substantial share of such spending is determined by federal regulations and therefore cannot simply be eliminated by a state government.
The criticism could therefore even consolidate the AfD’s hard-core electorate if it is perceived as yet another attempt by established institutions to prevent the party from gaining power.
The real political risk will emerge after the election
This is where the most important conclusion lies.
If the AfD remains in opposition, the €2.2 billion gap may have only a limited long-term effect: the party will be able to argue that it was simply denied the opportunity to implement its alternative policies.
If, however, the AfD gains real influence over the formation of a government or the budget, the situation will change. It will have to demonstrate exactly where it intends to find the €2.2 billion.
At that point, only a few practical options would remain: abandoning some of its promises, making substantially deeper spending cuts, finding new sources of revenue, or retreating from its position on government debt. Each of these options would carry political costs.
The €2.2 billion gap therefore represents a delayed political threat rather than an immediate electoral catastrophe for the AfD. The party may currently be able to win the election despite the budgetary contradiction. Yet victory itself would transform that contradiction from a problem of campaign communication into a problem of governance. If the AfD is unable to demonstrate realistic financing for its promises, Saxony-Anhalt could become not only the party’s first major governing success, but also its first major test—one that exposes the gap between the AfD’s effectiveness as a protest movement and its capacity for practical governance.
