According to a Reuters exclusive, citing U.S. officials familiar with classified intelligence, the CIA completed contingency assessments before military action against Iran that examined succession scenarios in the event of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death.
The principal judgment reported by Reuters was:
If Khamenei were killed, the most likely immediate beneficiaries would be hardline elements aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rather than moderates or reformists.
Main conclusions reportedly attributed to the CIA
No expectation of democratic transition
The assessment reportedly concluded that removing Khamenei alone would not trigger regime collapse or a pro-Western revolution. Instead, the regime possessed sufficient institutional resilience to manage succession.
We think that one of the more plausible strategic scenarios is not a democratic transition, but the emergence of an even more security-dominated and ideologically rigid regime. The key question is whether “more radical” would mean more ideological or more militarized—these are not necessarily the same thing.
The most likely successor system would not necessarily be led by a more radical cleric, but by a regime in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps becomes the dominant decision-maker while retaining a Supreme Leader as a source of constitutional and religious legitimacy. Recent analyses argue that a transition toward a security-state model has become increasingly plausible.
Possible power brokers include:
- Mojtaba Khamenei – long viewed as a leading succession candidate because of his close relationships with senior IRGC commanders and the Basij.
- Hossein Taeb – although unlikely to become Supreme Leader, he remains an influential security figure.
- Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf – a former IRGC commander who could emerge as a political coordinator rather than the supreme authority.
- Ahmad Vahidi – represents the hardline security establishment.
Such a system would probably: rely more heavily on coercion than clerical legitimacy; accelerate militarization of decision-making; expand domestic surveillance; prioritize missile, drone, and nuclear deterrence over economic reform.
Mojtaba Khamenei
For years, Mojtaba has been regarded by many analysts as the leading individual successor because he reportedly enjoys extensive support within conservative clerical circles and the IRGC. However, his succession would be controversial because it could be viewed as creating a hereditary leadership within a system founded on revolutionary principles.
Compared with his father, Mojtaba would likely: depend even more on the IRGC for political survival; possess less independent religious authority; therefore give security institutions greater influence over strategic decisions.
This could make the regime more militarized even if it is not more theologically radical.
Collective Leadership
Instead of concentrating power in one individual, Iran could evolve toward a collective leadership in which: the Supreme Leader becomes primarily symbolic; the IRGC dominates national security; the judiciary controls internal repression; the president manages economic affairs.
Some recent analyses argue that wartime pressures have already strengthened consensus-based decision-making among multiple security actors.
Who Could Be More Radical?
If “radical” refers to willingness to confront the United States, Israel, and Gulf states, several figures are often mentioned as part of the hardline security establishment: Hossein Taeb, Ahmad Vahidi, Mohsen Rezaei, Yahya Rahim Safavi.
Most of these individuals are unlikely to become Supreme Leader, because the office traditionally requires senior clerical credentials. However, they could exercise substantial influence behind the scenes or occupy key positions in a more militarized governing structure.
Intelligence Assessment
Paradoxically, a post-Khamenei Iran could become more dangerous even if it appears less ideological.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei combined: religious legitimacy, decades of institutional experience, and the authority to mediate between competing factions.
His successor may lack those advantages and instead depend on the IRGC to maintain elite cohesion. That could produce: greater reliance on coercion; reduced internal debate; increased tolerance for strategic risk; faster military decision-making; a stronger emphasis on asymmetric tools such as proxy networks, drones, cyber operations, and maritime coercion.
In political science, such systems are sometimes described as praetorian security states, where military-security institutions become the principal guarantors of regime survival.The most plausible post-Khamenei outcome is not an “Iranian Taliban” or a return to the revolutionary zeal of 1979, but rather a more militarized Islamic Republic in which the IRGC becomes the dominant center of power while a clerical Supreme Leader—potentially Mojtaba Khamenei or another senior cleric—provides constitutional and religious legitimacy. Such a system could prove less constrained, more risk-acceptant, and more difficult to deter, even if its ideological rhetoric changes little.
