A French publication has released an article by Romain Keppen, titled “MGIMO: Russia’s Factory of Confrontation with Europe,” in which the author, drawing on his own experience as a student at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), argues that Russia’s political elite and diplomatic institutions have spent decades deliberately cultivating the ideological foundations for a long-term confrontation with the “collective West.”
Keppen describes an academic environment characterized by strict censorship, the rehabilitation of Stalin’s cult of personality, the promotion of conspiracy theories—including false narratives surrounding the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 and claims that the European Union is “fascist”—and the systematic justification of Russia’s own aggression through accusations of Western hypocrisy. According to the author, these elements form part of an institutional doctrine designed to instill a structural hostility toward Europe among Russia’s future diplomats.
The article also highlights the strategic fallacy underlying calls by certain French political figures—including both the far-left La France Insoumise (LFI) and segments of the far right—for premature reconciliation with Moscow, the lifting of sanctions, or the normalization of relations with Russia. Keppen argues that the Kremlin does not view the war against Ukraine as a localized conflict but as part of a broader neo-imperial confrontation with the West, in which the European Union is officially portrayed as a principal adversary.
Romain Keppen’s analysis constitutes a compelling argument against the positions advanced by both far-right and far-left political forces in France that continue to advocate renewed dialogue with Moscow and the rapid removal of sanctions. The Kremlin consistently interprets calls for compromise not as evidence of diplomatic pragmatism or strategic wisdom, but as signs of Western weakness that encourage further political and geopolitical pressure.
The fact that Russia’s premier institution for training diplomats has incorporated hostility toward a united Europe into its state doctrine and educational curriculum should dispel any remaining illusions about the true objectives and ideological nature of the contemporary Russian state.
The Kremlin’s long-term strategic objective is not coexistence with Europe but the systematic weakening of European unity and the dismantling of the continent’s collective security architecture. This provides a compelling rationale for why Western political elites—particularly in France—should abandon counterproductive pro-Russian rhetoric and instead mobilize political, ideological, economic, and hybrid capabilities to counter Russia’s sustained campaign against the European security order.
More broadly, the article reinforces an increasingly important strategic assessment: Russia’s diplomatic establishment should not be viewed solely as a professional foreign service but as an institutional component of the Kremlin’s broader hybrid warfare apparatus. The ideological training provided at MGIMO suggests that future Russian diplomats are prepared not merely to represent state interests abroad, but to advance information operations, strategic influence campaigns, and narratives designed to undermine the cohesion of the European Union and NATO. This raises important questions about the future role of Russian diplomatic missions in Europe and underscores the need for Western governments to assess Russian diplomatic engagement through both diplomatic and counterintelligence lenses.
Romain Keppen’s testimony provides more than a personal account of studying at MGIMO; it offers a rare insider perspective on the institutional mindset underpinning Russia’s diplomatic establishment. If his observations accurately reflect prevailing educational practices, they suggest that MGIMO functions not simply as a diplomatic academy but as a strategic instrument for reproducing the Kremlin’s worldview across successive generations of Russian foreign policy elites.
The significance of this assessment extends beyond ideological indoctrination. Russia’s diplomatic corps has traditionally occupied a central position within Moscow’s broader architecture of state power, where diplomacy, intelligence, strategic communications, and active measures have historically operated as complementary rather than separate instruments. Consequently, the ideological formation of future diplomats directly affects Russia’s capacity to conduct long-term influence operations abroad.
Unlike the Soviet period, when ideological confrontation was primarily framed through the prism of communism versus capitalism, contemporary Russian strategic culture increasingly portrays international politics as a civilizational struggle between a sovereign “Russian world” and a morally decadent, politically fragmented West. If MGIMO institutionalizes this worldview, Russian diplomats are not merely trained to negotiate with Europe but to regard European institutions as adversaries whose cohesion should be weakened whenever opportunities arise.
This helps explain why Russian diplomatic messaging has become increasingly synchronized with broader Kremlin information operations. Narratives concerning NATO expansion, alleged “Russophobia,” historical revisionism, sanctions, migration, and the legitimacy of European institutions consistently reinforce strategic objectives pursued simultaneously by Russian intelligence services, state-controlled media, cyber actors, and political influence networks. Rather than operating independently, these instruments increasingly appear to constitute elements of a unified state strategy.
The article also provides important context for assessing the Kremlin’s negotiating behavior. Calls by European political actors for unconditional dialogue, sanctions relief, or a rapid normalization of relations frequently assume that Moscow seeks a mutually acceptable security arrangement. However, if future Russian diplomats are educated within an institutional framework that defines the European Union itself as a strategic adversary, such assumptions become increasingly questionable. Negotiations remain possible, but they should be understood primarily as instruments through which Russia seeks to improve its strategic position rather than as evidence of convergence over Europe’s future security architecture.
From a counterintelligence perspective, the implications are equally significant. Western governments have traditionally distinguished between legitimate diplomatic engagement and intelligence activities conducted under diplomatic cover. Keppen’s observations suggest that this distinction may require further refinement. If ideological education explicitly prepares diplomats to advance narratives intended to weaken European cohesion, influence domestic political debates, or exploit societal divisions, diplomatic missions become not only channels of interstate communication but also potential platforms for long-term strategic influence operations. This does not imply that every Russian diplomat performs intelligence functions; rather, it indicates that the institutional objectives of Russian diplomacy increasingly overlap with those of the Kremlin’s broader hybrid warfare strategy.
The article also carries important implications for domestic politics across Europe. Russian influence operations increasingly rely on exploiting existing political polarization rather than creating entirely new divisions. Political movements advocating unilateral sanctions relief, reduced support for Ukraine, or the re-establishment of a “strategic partnership” with Moscow—whether on the far left or far right—may unintentionally amplify narratives that align with Russia’s long-term objective of fragmenting European consensus. Moscow has consistently demonstrated a preference for engaging actors capable of weakening decision-making within democratic institutions rather than seeking ideological alignment on every issue.
Perhaps the most important strategic conclusion concerns the nature of Russia’s long-term objectives. Keppen’s account reinforces a growing body of evidence suggesting that the Kremlin does not regard the war against Ukraine as an isolated territorial dispute but as one theater within a broader confrontation over the future European security order. Within this framework, Ukraine represents the immediate battlefield, while European political cohesion, NATO solidarity, and transatlantic unity constitute the ultimate strategic targets.
Accordingly, the challenge confronting European governments extends well beyond military deterrence. Countering Russia’s long-term strategy requires strengthening societal resilience against disinformation, improving intelligence coordination, protecting democratic institutions from foreign influence, and integrating diplomatic engagement with robust counterintelligence and strategic communications policies. Russia’s diplomatic establishment should therefore be assessed not only through the lens of traditional statecraft but also as an integral component of the Kremlin’s comprehensive hybrid warfare architecture.
MGIMO should be understood less as a conventional university and more as a strategic institution that contributes to the intellectual, ideological, and operational preparation of personnel supporting Russia’s long-term competition with the Euro-Atlantic community.
Available open-source evidence indicates that MGIMO has progressively aligned its educational programs with the Kremlin’s official foreign policy doctrine, particularly following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, more decisively, after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While direct access to internal teaching materials remains limited, multiple indicators suggest that anti-Western narratives are no longer peripheral political views expressed by individual lecturers but constitute an increasingly institutionalized component of diplomatic education.
Alignment with official strategic documents. Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept explicitly identifies the “collective West” as pursuing a policy of containment against Russia and characterizes the United States and its allies as principal sources of international instability. MGIMO, operating under the authority of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is expected to prepare future diplomats within this official doctrinal framework.
Operational Significance
If these trends accurately reflect institutional policy, MGIMO graduates are likely to enter the Russian diplomatic service with several enduring assumptions: NATO is viewed not as a defensive alliance but as the principal military instrument of Western strategic encirclement. The European Union is perceived not merely as an economic bloc but as a geopolitical actor subordinate to U.S. strategic interests and engaged in efforts to constrain Russian power.International law is interpreted primarily through the prism of great-power competition rather than universal legal norms. Diplomacy is regarded as one component of a broader strategic confrontation encompassing information operations, economic coercion, cyber activities, and political influence.
Intelligence Implications
For Western governments, this raises an important analytical consideration: future Russian diplomats may increasingly approach negotiations from a paradigm of managed confrontation rather than cooperative conflict resolution. Their mission may extend beyond representing Russian foreign policy to actively shaping political narratives, influencing elite discourse, identifying societal vulnerabilities, and advancing long-term strategic objectives consistent with the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare doctrine.Consequently, Russian diplomatic engagement should be assessed not solely through the framework of traditional diplomacy but also as part of Russia’s integrated strategy combining diplomacy, strategic communications, intelligence support, and influence operations. This does not imply that every MGIMO graduate participates in intelligence activities, but it does suggest that the institutional culture increasingly prepares diplomats for sustained strategic competition with the Euro-Atlantic community rather than for the restoration of a cooperative European security order.
Recent expulsions significantly reduced Moscow’s official-cover intelligence capacity in Europe, but they did not eliminate Russian influence operations. Instead, they forced Russia to adapt: fewer embassy-based intelligence officers, more reliance on non-official-cover operatives, criminal networks, local proxies, cyber assets, “one-time agents,” front NGOs, media cutouts, and ideologically sympathetic political actors.
European expulsions after 2022 removed hundreds of Russian personnel, many assessed as intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover. This degraded Russia’s ability to run traditional embassy-based espionage networks, recruit sources openly, maintain local contacts, and coordinate influence operations through diplomatic missions. Western services publicly assessed this as a serious blow to Russian intelligence infrastructure.
However, the effect was displacement rather than neutralization. Russia appears to have compensated by using more deniable and lower-cost methods: recruited civilians, organized-crime intermediaries, business figures, journalists, activists, diaspora links, cyber operators, and disposable agents for sabotage or surveillance tasks. Recent research and European cases indicate a shift toward less professional but more numerous proxy networks.
The clearest indicator is the rise in sabotage and subversion incidents across Europe after the expulsions. CSIS assessed that Russian attacks in Europe nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024, after quadrupling between 2022 and 2023, with the GRU likely responsible for many operations.
The expulsions worked tactically: they damaged Russia’s embassy-based intelligence networks and raised operational costs. But strategically, they pushed Moscow toward a more decentralized, deniable, and risk-tolerant model of influence and sabotage.
For Europe, this means the main threat has shifted from classic “spy-diplomat” activity to a hybrid ecosystem involving: diplomatic remnants + illegals/NOCs + cyber units + criminal facilitators + political proxies + local recruits + information platforms.
Therefore, expulsions should be seen as necessary but insufficient. They must be paired with tighter visa screening, monitoring of Russian diplomatic travel, financial tracking of proxy networks, counterintelligence work against political influence channels, and disruption of sabotage financing.
