Slovakia remains the only EU member state that, at ambassadorial level in Brussels, has blocked the proposed 12-month extension of part of the anti-Russian sanctions, insisting on retaining a six-month review cycle. Because extending the restrictive measures requires the unanimous support of all 27 member states, Bratislava’s position gives Robert Fico’s government disproportionate negotiating leverage ahead of the mid-September deadline.
Fico’s actions are becoming increasingly difficult to view solely as an attempt to protect Slovakia’s specific economic interests. Bratislava is effectively turning the sanctions-renewal procedure into a recurring mechanism for political bargaining with the European Union. Retaining a six-month cycle would mean that twice a year any decision on sanctions would once again depend on Slovak consent. This gives Fico’s government a permanent lever over Brussels on issues that may have no direct connection to Russia.
This is also reflected in the Slovak prime minister’s parallel rhetoric concerning the EU’s next multiannual budget. Fico has already threatened to use a veto if Brussels cuts funding for farmers or, in Bratislava’s view, fails to take sufficient account of the specific features of Slovakia’s agricultural sector. Sanctions, the EU budget, agricultural subsidies and relations with Ukraine are therefore gradually being folded into a single negotiating strategy: Slovakia is using areas that require unanimity to maximize concessions from other members of the Union.
Particularly revealing is Bratislava’s demand not only to shorten the period for which sanctions are renewed but also to secure the removal of individual Russian businessmen from the sanctions lists. Unless this position is supported by compelling Slovak economic or legal interests, it objectively coincides with one of Moscow’s key objectives: the gradual erosion of personal sanctions against Russia’s political and economic elites. In that case, Bratislava is no longer merely a critic of EU sanctions policy but effectively a channel for advancing decisions within European institutions that benefit Russian elites.
Fico’s political rhetoric reinforces this assessment. His claims that the West made the wrong decisions after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, and that the war could supposedly have ended much earlier, reproduce important elements of Russia’s strategic narrative: responsibility for the duration of the war is shifted in part from the aggressor state to the Western governments that supported Ukraine. Combined with the blocking of sanctions, this forms a consistent political line aimed at weakening the European consensus on Russia.
In this sense, Fico is effectively laying claim to the political niche long occupied by Viktor Orban: that of the principal internal opponent of a tough EU policy toward Moscow. The Slovak model, however, could prove even more useful to the Kremlin. The issue is not only pro-Russian rhetoric or demonstrative distancing from support for Ukraine, but the use of specific EU institutional mechanisms — above all the unanimity requirement — to generate recurring crises around sanctions decisions.
For Moscow, the value of such a position does not necessarily lie in the immediate lifting of sanctions. More important may be preventing the EU from moving to longer and more predictable sanctions cycles. Annual renewals would reduce the number of opportunities for the Kremlin to influence individual governments and create political crises around each subsequent vote. A six-month cycle, by contrast, leaves two regular “windows of vulnerability” every year during which Moscow can count on diplomatic pressure, lobbying, political incentives or changes in the domestic situation of one member state.
The current dispute therefore goes far beyond the technical question of whether sanctions should be extended for six or 12 months. In effect, it is a struggle over how often Russia will have an opportunity to test EU unity and how easily an individual government can turn sanctions policy into an object of intra-European bargaining.
At the same time, the claim that Fico directly “works for the Kremlin” requires separate evidence of coordination, financing or another direct link. On the basis of political behavior alone, it is more accurate to speak of a structural and systematic convergence between Bratislava’s positions and Russia’s strategic interests. A key indicator will be whether Slovakia uses its veto to obtain specific concessions connected to its own economic interests, or continues to advance demands whose principal beneficiaries are Moscow and sanctioned Russian elites.
If the second scenario becomes entrenched, Slovakia’s role will shift from that of an EU “difficult partner” to a systemic internal spoiler of sanctions policy. For the Kremlin, this would have an impact far broader than helping individual oligarchs: Moscow would gain the ability to use one member state to demonstrate the fragility of European unanimity, raise the political cost of every subsequent sanctions decision and gradually normalize the very debate over easing restrictions on Russia.
Much of Fico’s behavior can be explained by domestic political logic: anti-Brussels rhetoric mobilizes part of the Smer electorate, allows him to portray himself as a defender of Slovak economic interests and gives Bratislava additional negotiating leverage within the EU. At the same time, the outcome of this policy often objectively serves Russia’s strategic interests.
The main reasons: Electoral advantage. For years, Fico has built his political platform around sovereignty, criticism of Brussels, skepticism toward military assistance to Ukraine and the argument that sanctions harm Europeans. Retreating from this line would weaken his own political brand.
The energy factor. Slovakia has historically depended to a significant degree on Russian energy resources and transit infrastructure. Fico can therefore present the preservation of economic channels with Russia as an issue of prices, industrial competitiveness and energy security.
- The veto as negotiating capital. For a small state, the unanimity principle is one of the strongest instruments of influence within the EU. If Bratislava can block sanctions, the budget or another strategic decision, its demands cannot simply be ignored. Fico therefore has an interest in having sanctions reviewed more frequently rather than once a year.
Ideological proximity of certain narratives. Fico increasingly describes the war through the prism of Western responsibility, the failure of diplomacy and the need to restore relations with Moscow. This is not identical to the Russian position, but it overlaps substantially with key themes of Russia’s information campaign in Europe.
The model of a “sovereign” foreign policy. Fico seeks to demonstrate that Slovakia should not automatically follow the political line of Brussels, Berlin or Paris. Relations with Moscow become a means of demonstrating that autonomy.
The most important question, however, is what exactly Bratislava demands in exchange for its consent. If Fico is bargaining for compensation for Slovak companies, energy guarantees or agricultural subsidies, this can be explained in terms of national interest. But if he seeks shorter sanctions periods, a weakening of the sanctions regime itself or the removal of specific Russian oligarchs, the explanation based on Slovak economic interests becomes considerably weaker.
This is where the key analytical dividing line lies. It is not necessary to prove that Moscow controls Fico in order to conclude that the Kremlin is one of the principal external beneficiaries of his policies.
Moreover, after Moscow lost a reliable Hungarian blocking vote, Slovakia acquired particular value for the Kremlin. Russia does not need to “control the EU”; it is enough to have one of the 27 states prepared to invoke the unanimity rule at a critical moment. Bratislava can then function as a veto player: delaying decisions, demanding exemptions, forcing compromises and reopening the debate over the merits of sanctions every six months.
Fico may be acting primarily to ensure his own political survival and strengthen Slovakia’s negotiating weight, but the strategy he has chosen simultaneously turns Bratislava into Moscow’s most convenient point of influence over the EU sanctions consensus.
The EU has ways to raise the cost of obstruction for Bratislava. The most realistic response, therefore, is not a formal punishment for Fico’s position but a combination of budgetary, political and legal pressure.
The strongest lever — EU money
This is where Fico is most vulnerable. Slovakia itself insists on maintaining a strong cohesion policy and agricultural funding in the EU budget for 2028–2034. In May 2026, Bratislava even initiated a joint declaration by 16 states defending funding for regions and farmers.
This creates an obvious negotiating counterweight. Paris, Berlin, Warsaw and other capitals can effectively tell Fico: if Slovakia uses unanimity to block the EU’s common foreign policy, other states are under no obligation to support Slovak budget priorities.
It is especially important that negotiations over the 2028–2034 budget are already difficult: Germany is demanding substantial cuts to the proposed budget of nearly €2 trillion.
Thus, cohesion and agricultural funds are potentially the most effective political lever against Fico.
Freezing funds is possible – but requires a legal basis
The EU has a budget conditionality mechanism that allows payments to be suspended when breaches of rule-of-law principles pose a sufficiently direct threat to the Union’s financial interests. But Brussels cannot legally freeze Slovak funds simply because Fico is blocking sanctions against Russia.
Another area therefore becomes critical: the rule of law, judicial independence, oversight of the use of European funds and anti-corruption mechanisms.
If the Commission establishes the necessary legal link between violations and risks to the EU budget, financial pressure could become much more serious.
The Commission can increase legal pressure
The European Commission can open infringement procedures over specific violations of EU law and ultimately refer cases to the Court of Justice of the European Union, which can impose financial penalties.
This is no longer a purely theoretical instrument in Slovakia’s case. In 2026, for example, the Commission pursued cases against Bratislava concerning discriminatory fuel pricing and the incorrect application of EU rules on legal aid.
Brussels could therefore move from one major political confrontation with Fico to a sustained legal pressure campaign over specific violations, provided there is a legal basis for each case.
Article 7 – the “nuclear option,” but not for the veto itself
If problems with democracy and the rule of law reach the level of a serious and systemic breach of the EU’s fundamental values, the use of Article 7 TEU is theoretically possible.
Its final stage can even suspend a state’s voting rights in the Council. But the threshold is extremely high: establishing a serious and persistent breach requires unanimity among the other members of the European Council, and Article 7 is designed to protect the EU’s fundamental values, not to punish a country for a foreign-policy veto.
It is therefore practically impossible to deprive Fico of his veto through Article 7 solely because of his position on Russia.
Political isolation may prove more effective
Another scenario would see Slovakia increasingly bypassed in the formation of key agreements.
Major countries could coordinate decisions in advance without Bratislava, limit its influence in informal negotiations, withhold support for Slovak candidates for influential posts, and shift some assistance to Ukraine into coalition-of-the-willing formats where a Slovak veto carries no weight at all.
For Fico, this creates a paradox: the more often he uses the veto to increase Slovakia’s influence, the stronger the incentive for other countries to create mechanisms in which Slovakia has no influence.
The most interesting scenario — a “veto trade-off”
Fico’s budget threat itself could become his weak point.
He is effectively saying: “I can block the budget if I do not get enough for Slovak farmers and regions.” Other states can respond symmetrically: “We will not support your agricultural and cohesion demands while you block strategic decisions on Russia.”
This would no longer be a legal punishment but hard intra-European bargaining.
And here the balance of power is not necessarily favorable to Fico. Bratislava can indeed block a decision requiring unanimity. But the 27th vote gives it the right to say “no” — it does not force the other 26 states to accept Slovakia’s budget demands.
The principal risk for Fico is that excessive use of the veto could turn Slovakia’s negotiating asset into a strategic liability. If Bratislava systematically uses unanimity to block sanctions against Russia, key EU states may link their willingness to support Slovak priorities in the 2028–2034 budget to more constructive Slovak behavior on foreign-policy issues. In that case, the groups that could ultimately pay the highest price for the Fico government’s pro-Russian course would be precisely those — farmers, regions and recipients of EU funds — whose interests the prime minister invokes to justify his confrontation with Brussels.The current dispute concerns personal sanctions, whereas the Council of the EU already extended sectoral economic sanctions against Russia in June 2026 for 12 months — until July 31, 2027.
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